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Chapter 1
Introduction
A professor of theoretical physics always has to be told what to look for. He
just uses his knowledge to explain the observations of the experimenters!
Richard P. Feynman("What do you care what other people think.")
Experimentation is an important tool for studying the world around us.It
allows the active selection of new information for integration into existing knowl-
edge. Science claims it to be the most effective of the empirical methodologies
available for studying unknown phenomena. This dissertation defines a paradig-
m for studying empirical methodologies (including experimentation). We define
normative models' for experimentation and identify important parameters to vary
when studying these models. We then develop several approximations to these
normative models.Empirical results from experimentation performed on these
approximations are presented.
'A normative model describeshow the item modeled should behave.2
Why study experimental methodology? After all, it has been used successfully
since the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. We see four strong reasons
for this exploratory study:
There is no direct scientific evidence specifying which experimental method-
ologies are optimal under a given set of conditions. Cognitive science is just
beginning to classify the experimental strategies and procedures that have
been used in empirical science [Kulkarni:88].
A major goal of machine learning is to create autonomous self-improving
computers [Moravec:88].Currently, most machine learning programs are
passive receptors of knowledge presented by a tutor. Can autonomous learn-
ing systems be as effective as tutored systems?
The philosophy of science has debated for years the question of which exper-
imental methodologies are best and how experiments should be integrated
into current knowledge [Hacking:83, Popper:59, Platt:64, Kuhn:70]. New in-
sight to resolve the issues debated might come from empirical comparison of
different experimental methodologies.
Informal experimentation has been shown to be a major component of
how people understand and learn about the world around them [Simon:83,
Klahr:89].Detailed understanding of the role experimentation plays may
allow us to improve the learning process itself.
To study experimentation, we must first define what an experiment is and what
is to be learned from these experiments. We have adopted the standard view in
machine learning: that the goal of learning is to determine an unknown function E
by analyzing a collection of training examples of the form (4, E(4)). The training
examples illustrate the behavior of the function for some given values ofThe
goal of learning is to guess the behavior of the function on the remaining values of
x. In this view, an experiment consists of providing an i value to E and observingUnknown
System
E( g
Figure 1. Simplified Model of Empirical Research.
the corresponding output value y = E(i). Figure 1 illustrates this simple model
of experimentation.
In our model, empirical research is split into two subsystems, which we call the
theorist and the empiricist. The theorist is responsible for constructing theories
consistent with the available data. The empiricist is responsible for selecting and
performing experiments. More specifically, the theorist has two major tasks: (1) to
model E when given a sequence of training examples and (2) to provide information
to guide the empiricist in selecting new training examples.
The empiricist must provide the sequence of training examples to the theorist
by using either passive observation or active experimentation. A passive observer
must wait for training examples and simply collect whatever is provided (either by
the environment or by the teacher). An active experimenter selects its own training
examples by choosing an experiment 4, presenting it to the unknown system, and
observing the associated result, E(4).
To compare the performance of different training example sources, we can mea-
sure the convergence speed of the theoristthe number of training examples needed
to find a correct model of E. By comparing the convergence speed of the same
theorist using different training example sources, we can discover which source is
most effective at providing good training sequences. Likewise, by comparing the
convergence speed of different theorists using the same training example source, we
can discover which sources are most robust. Hence we are searching for empirical
methods that are most effective at increasing the convergence speed of a theorist.
Even this simple model of empirical research provokes some interesting ques-
tions: What selects the training examples? If actively selected, what criteria areused? From what domain are the inputs I selected? When is it best to work
on hypothesis generation, as opposed to gathering new information (as training
examples)?
This dissertation presents a mixture of theoretical and empirical research that
investigates specific aspects of the following four questions:
Question 1 Does active experimentation provide more effective training examples
to the theorist than passive observation?
To answer this question we investigate three different empirical methods, which
we have named the observer, the oracle, and the experimenter.
The observer allows the external environment to select its training examples
(in the model of Figure 1, the environment selects thevalues that are input
to the unknown system E). A disadvantage is that the observer must wait until
the environment presents the example. Furthermore, the same example may be
observed many times, and some examples may never be observed.
The oracle simulates an idealized teacher tutoring a student.The student
is an observer than passively collects the data presented by the teacher, who is
an oracle that has complete knowledge of E and also of the current hypotheses
under consideration by the theorist. With this knowledge, the teacher can select
training examples that most efficiently isolate the desired theory.This is not
a realistic model of scientific research, because no such oracle exists. However, it
provides a "best-case scenario"no method of choosing experiments can do better.
By comparing active and passive methods to this oracle, we can determine how
effective self-selected training examples are compared to tutor-selected examples.
The experimenter selects its own training examples by performing experi-
mentsselecting an 4, presenting it to E, and noting the result E(4). Unlike
the observer and the oracle, which were passive, the experimenter is active. An
active method would appear to have a key advantage by selecting informative5
training examples rather than waiting for them.
Comparing the convergence speed of a simple theorist using these three empir-
ical methodologies yields an answer to Question One. The specifics are described
in Chapter Four.
The experimenter described above needs some procedure to choose the next
training example. This raises the second question:
Question 2 What selection criterion should an experimenter apply in choosing an
experiment?
At each point in the learning process where the researcher needs more infor-
mation, it must perform an experiment to generate a training example. To select
which experiment to perform, the researcher applies some set of criteria, which we
call the experiment bias. For example, one experiment bias would be to change
only one input to E at a time. Another bias might be to choose an experiment at
random. Given this definition of experiment bias, Question Two can be rephrased
as "what is the best experiment bias ?"
A good experiment bias selects experiments that allow the theorist to quickly
converge to the correct theory. The oracle, who knows both E and the internals
of the theorist, can employ an optimal experiment bias. Such a bias would se-
lect the shortest sequence of experiments sufficient to make the theorist converge.
For realistic experimenters, the experiment bias cannot be guaranteed to find the
shortest sequence. Instead, experiment bias provides a principled way of guessing
which experiments will be most informative.
Experiment bias can be contrasted with the more familiar theory bias. Theory
bias consists of those criteria employed by the theorist to decide which hypothesis
to believe when more than one hypothesis is consistent with the available train-
ing examples [Mitche11:80]. Theory bias usually takes two forms: (a) restricted
hypothesis space bias and (b) preference bias. A restricted hypothesis space bias
considers only a subset of the space of all possible hypotheses for E. A prefer-6
ence bias indicates, for any hypotheses h1 and h2 consistent with the available
training examples, which hypothesis is preferred. One general way of representing
bias is to provide a probability distribution over the hypothesis space. Hypotheses
with zero probability are excludedthus providing a restricted hypothesis space
bias. Hypotheses with greater prior probability are preferred to those with lesser
probabilitythus providing a preference bias.
In principle, an optimal experiment bias can be derived from the underlying
theory bias. Given a theory bias expressed as a prior probability distribution, we
can compute the probability that each experiment sequence (e1, e2, e3, ,ek) will
lead the theorist to converge. Hence, for each experiment ei, we can compute the
expected length of all experiment sequences with et as their first experiment. The
ideal experiment bias chooses the ei with the shortest expected experiment length.
In practice, however, this computation is infeasible (it requires time exponential
in the length of the shortest experiment sequence). Furthermore, it would need
to be recomputed for every theory biasand theory biases vary from one learning
system to another. Hence, it would be better it we could find a "general purpose"
experiment bias that worked well for a wide range of theory biases.
Consequently, we rate experiment bias using three metrics: (1) the performance
of an experiment bias as measured by the convergence speed of the theorist; (2)
the robustness of the experiment bias under different theory biases (a robust ex-
periment bias will perform consistently and reliably); and (3) the computational
cost, or amount of analysis, required to compute the experiment bias.
To study experiment bias, we define a normative model of experiment bias along
with several approximations to this normative model. We then compare them using
the three metrics above. This yields an answer to Question Two (details are in
Chapter Five).
An orthogonal issue is how studying the structure of an unknown system might
help in discovering its function.All real systems have some internal structure
that causes the system to manifest its external behavior. Usually, there is a one-7
to-many relationship between function and structurethat is, any one externally
observable function can be implemented by many different internal structures.
Hence, if only the input/output behavior of an unknown system E is observable,
it is generally most efficient to model E functionally rather then structurally
because there are many fewer functional hypotheses than structural ones. However,
in some situations, the researcher may have access to the internal structure of E.
In those cases, it is possible to perform structural access experiments (also called
decomposition experiments) to determine the internal structure of E. This brings
us to Question Three.
Question 3 Are decomposition experiments more effective than functional exper-
iments?
In other words, does the increased information obtained from decomposition
experiments compensate for the increased size of the space of hypotheses (the
structural hypotheses) that must now be considered?
Unfortunately, this question is ill-posed, because it assumes that the cost of
performing a structural decomposition experiment is the same as the cost of per-
forming a functional experiment. Hence we cannot answer this question in any
general way. We can, however, ask whether the various empirical methods (the
observer, the oracle, and the experimenter) yield the same relative performance
on decomposition experiments and functional experiments. If the relative perfor-
mance (and relative robustness) is the same, then there has been no real change
in effectiveness from using structural information. We investigate three cases: (a)
learning the function of an unknown system given access to decomposition ex-
periments, (b) learning the function of the unknown system given access to both
functional and decomposition experiments, and (c) learning the structure of an un-
known system given access to decomposition experiments. Details are presented
in Chapter Six.
Finally we need to address how the theorist and empiricist interact.8
Question 4 How should the trade-off between experimentation and theory forma-
tion be managed?
A practical system must split its effort between empirical and theoretical stu-
dy of an unknown system. The theorist develops and refines theories to explain
training examples (and to help guide the empiricist), while the empiricist gathers
new training examples. The more time spent in the theorist, the more effective
the training examples might be. But if the theorist lacks training examples, it will
not have enough information to generate accurate hypotheses. Many important
practical issues arise in addressing this question. We explore these in Chapter
Seven.
Chapter Two reviews the previous research and philosophy leading to this work.
Chapter Three describes the methodology and terminology of this dissertation.
Chapters Four through Six address each of Questions One through Three above by
performing meta-experiments.' We finish with an evaluation of how effectively the
above questions were addressed, our overall conclusions, and point out interesting
open questions and future research directions.
2We call any experiment we the human researcher performed on experimentation a meta-
experiment to distinguish them from the experiments that the simulated researcher performs.9
Chapter 2
History and Background
For all of recorded history (and most likely long before people learned to read
and write), we have been interested in learning how and why the world around
us works. A fairly new phenomenon has been the study of ourselves, or more
specifically, trying to understand how we understand the world. We know that
new information is processed and incorporated into a person's current knowledge,
but we are far from understanding how this is accomplished.
Several fields have studied the problem. We begin by presenting the work from
philosophy of science, history of science, and cognitive science which contributed
to this dissertation. This is followed by a more detailed look at the contributions
from artificial intelligence and machine learning.
2.1Philosophical and Descriptive Studies
First we look at the research and discussion that has investigated how people
learn and understand. These have been either philosophical arguments or descrip-
tive studies which have been developed by three main fields: philosophy of science,
history of science, and cognitive science.
Philosophy of science has been interested in discovering sound processes for
reasoning about obtaining new information. By creating sound arguments from
first principles they hope to discover the better methodologies for learning and to10
argue their utility. History of science has taken another tack, studying records (lab
books, diaries, personal letters) of how past scientific discoveries were made. The
hope is that careful study of the methods used will lead to a general understand-
ing of learning and discovery. Cognitive science (and machine learning) are both
interested in how learning occurs, but from two separate viewpoints. Cognitive
science tries to understand what cognition is and how it works by studying and
modeling human cognition (we discuss machine learning in detail later). We now
look at how each of these fields contributed to this dissertation.
2.1.1Philosophy of Science
Before the seventeenth century, most "science" involved the construction of per-
suasive arguments using "pure reason." As an example, consider the Pythagorean
cosmos and its derivatives. The Pythagoreans believed the cosmos was created
through divine intervention and thus must be perfect. They then tried to con-
struct explanations based on the harmony and symmetry of the cosmos that did
not contradict observation too much. Contradictions were seen as a failure of our
ability, as imperfect beings, to understand the mind of the Gods rather than a
failure of the theory. For example, in [Zeilik:76]:
The ideas of Plato (428-348 B.C.) derived from the Pythagorean sys-
tem, and his questions concerning the cosmosalthough he answered
them in vague termsinitiated the invention of an influential cosmo-
logical picture. Plato saw the perfection of the universe in the form of
a three-dimensional sphere: in keeping with this intuitive harmony, all
motions of the heavenly bodies must be composed of uniform circular
motions.
All this changed during the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century
when philosophers, lead by Francis Bacon, proposed active experimentation was
the best way to discovering "the truth" [Bacon:60]. Bacon enjoined researchers to11
"twist the lion's tail" to learn about the world around them. Thus the scientific
revolution was not a change in our basic knowledge of the universe but a change
in how we obtained our knowledge of the universe.
Since this revolution, a spectrum has emerged to describe one of the roles that
experimentation plays in science: from theory-centered at one extreme to data-
centered at the other. Typical proponents of the theory-centered view [Popper:59,
Hemp le:66, Kuhn:70] assert that theory precedes experimentthe result of any
experiment is always an interpretation of the raw data viewed in light of some
theory. With this view, progress is made by positing a set of hypotheses (prefer-
ably a large set of overlapping but mutually inconsistent hypotheses) and then
carefully selecting a set of experiments to falsify as many of these hypotheses as
possible. [Platt:64] claims a variation of this procedurewhich he called "strong
inference"yields rapid progress. Strong inference consists of (a) devising alterna-
tive hypotheses, (b) finding a crucial experiment to exclude at least one hypothesis,
and (c) performing the experiment. When these steps are repeated, he claims that
"for exploring the unknown there is no faster method; [strong inference] yields the
minimum number of steps."
The opposite end of the spectrumthe data-centered viewalso has its fol-
lowing [Hacking:83, Carnap:66]. These philosophers assert that hypotheses are
not needed to perform meaningful experiments. In fact, to be able to form any
hypotheses (via induction), initial observations or experiments (without the aid of
any underlying hypotheses) are needed to gain enough knowledge of the unknown
system to be able to form an hypothesis (hypotheses formed without any facts are
vacuous).
None of this addresses our Questions One, Two, or Three. Most of the argu-
ment is over our Question Fourthe tradeoffs between theory formation and ex-
perimentation. By choosing a strategy along the data-driven versus theory-driven
spectrum, a scientist chooses a given class of experimental strategies. Several types
of experimental strategy are common in scientific research, falling into one of three12
categories. First are the exploratory experiments, which require no explicit hy-
pothesis formation. These are fully data-driven experiments whose purpose is to
discover and investigate the range and effect of a new or unknown phenomenon.
For example, when Röntgen first noticed that X-rays passed through objects, he
started trying to discover what other objects the X-rays would or would not pass
through, using anything at hand. He tried many things through simple random
choice (e.g., paper, books, decks of cards, metal foils, glass, sheets of rubber, wood,
his hand, liquids, paints, and so on), but some of them yielded "interesting" results
(e.g., why was leaded glass opaque, but not unleaded glass?). A key factor when
performing data-driven experiments is the ability to notice "interesting" events or
results.
Second are the confirmation experiments, which require only one explicit hy-
pothesis to be formed. This is often the second stage of investigating a new phe-
nomenon. The researcher has gathered enough data to finally form a partial hy-
pothesis, then can gather more data until gaining confidence in the original data
and procedures. This is because new instruments and procedures must often be cre-
ated to study the new phenomenon: without performing confirming experiments,
a researcher can be fooled by systematic errors and unknown inputs (e.g., the cold
fusion experiments of 1988 through 1989). Although it is an important step, it is
considered mainly an intermediate step between discovery and understanding.
Finally are a group of experiments we call "relevant" experiments, which re-
quire at least two explicit hypotheses to be formed. Several "traditionally named"
experiment types are in this category, including discrimination experiments and
critical experiments. The main idea behind relevant experiments is they are guar-
anteed to eliminate at least one of several competing hypothesesthe experiments
are relevant to the task of eliminating competing hypotheses. This is a much more
theory-driven methodology than the other two methods above. As stated above,
many believe it is the most effective method for rapid learning. The big question
with relevant experiments is, how relevant do they have to be to be effective? Are13
some experiments "more relevant" than others (leading to more rapid learning)?
Is it more effective to try to eliminate larger numbers of hypotheses at a time, or
to just eliminate something every time? We investigate these in Chapters Four
though Six.
2.1.2History of Science
The history of science attempts to understand how scientists learn and discover
by studying the steps they have taken when making major discoveries. By studying
how people have made significant discoveries, the history of science hopes to shed
light on the process of learning and discovery itself. This is mostly through the
gathering of heuristics (rules-of-thumb) that past scientists have used.
An important example of this methodology is [Kulkarni:88], who feel that the
process of discovery can be made much more rigorous and automatedthat there
is a science of discovery. They analyzed the steps leading to several important
discoveries in science (e.g., Krebs' discovery of the urea cycle, Faraday's discovery
of induction of electricity from magnetism) and created an expert system that
uses a set of heuristics to generate hypotheses and experiments. A small core of
heuristics emerged that were adequate to explain most of the steps taken by the
scientists when making their discoveries.
Most of the history of science can be related to our work. All four questions
we posed in Chapter One have been addressed (to some degree). Regarding our
Question One (active versus passive learning), the history of science accepts that
active experimentation is more powerful than passive observation (both in learning
a larger class of hypotheses and in learning speed). We take this one more step
and attempt to quantify the change in learning speed.
Regarding our Question Two (experiment bias), history of science shows that
most researchers use a simple relevant bias.This is because many times a re-
searcher has very few experimental choices due to factors like cost, ethics, and
time limitations. It is also often difficult to design an effective experiment, so the14
researcher has to settle for the simplest, lowest cost effective experiment avail-
able that is in any way relevant. Hence, our question about the effectiveness of
experiment bias has large significance. If we demonstrate that simple relevant ex-
periment are nearly optimal, then we have vindicated the trust that scientists have
been forced to place in this simple experimental bias.
Regarding our Question Three (structural decompositional experiments), it is
obvious from history of science that most of science prefers structural access exper-
iments. This is hardly surprising considering that science is ultimately interested
in the structure of the universe. Obviously, structure cannot often be learned from
functional experiments (because often many structures can yield the same func-
tional behavior). But often, only the function is of interest.In these cases, is
it necessary to learn the structure also? We address this facet of the structural
decompositional question.
Finally, regarding our Question Four (the theory formation/experimentation
tradeoff), the history of science shows that most great scientists tended to lean to-
wards the data-centered view of the world. Few great discoveries have come from
extensive theorizing followed by a search for the data to substantiate that theoriz-
ing. Most discoveries come from a scientist noticing an unexplained phenomenon,
collecting data, then positing and testing theories. Our work cannot validate either
the theory-centered or data-centered view. If fact, I posit that both are essential for
a healthy science: theory-centered for pushing forward and detailing our current
theories, and data-centered for the times we stumble upon new or undiscovered
phenomena.
Next we look at how the sciences of learningcognitive science and machine
learninghave studied experimentation.
2.1.3Cognitive Science
Cognitive science studies "cognition," the process of perceiving and knowing,
which includes understanding how people learn and discover. Two approaches have15
been taken: (a) studying how people learn in small "toy" environments and (b)
studying how a tutor keeps track of the progress a student makes while learning. In
general, the cognitive science research suggests people use a mix of discrimination
and confirmation experiments: discrimination to eliminate alternative hypotheses
and confirmation to increase confidence in both experimental results (ruling out
experimental errors) and to test the breadth of a hypothesis. We will look at
several specific cases next.
[Klahr:89] investigated how people experiment to learn the operation of a small
programmable robot toy called "Big Trak." The subjects were shown how to use
several commands and then given an incorrect theory of how a new command
worked. They were then asked to form a theory of what the command actually
did. This required them to design and perform experiments (i.e., write programs
for the Big Trak using the unknown command) to test and correct their theory.
The conclusion was that people are very skilled at designing experiments that
gather near maximal information. Several heuristics were often used by the most
effective subjects. They tended to design experiments whose results were easy to
observe and distinct (i.e., difficult to confuse), and they tended to focus on one
independent variable at a timethe one expected to return the most information.
When an experiment yielded surprising results, they would change their strategy
to investigate that result.Finally, if the initial hypothesis was considered very
likely, then they tested it at several data points without generating any competing
hypotheses. On the other hand, if the initial hypothesis seemed unlikely, they
would generate and test several competing hypotheses and perform discrimination
experiments to differentiate among these hypotheses.
Relating this to our work, only active experiments were used. They saw sev-
eral different experiment biases, the most effective was relevance. There was no
structure involved, all experiments and hypotheses were simple input/output ex-
periments (similar to our functional experiments except that the specific command
they used for the unknown explicitly involved state information and thus was not16
a simple functional experiment). They did not address the theory/experiment
trade-off.
[Greenwald:86] studied how scientists use active experimentation. They found
that when a researcher's primary goal is to test a theory, this can lead to a bias
towards confirmational experiments. They propose two strategies to overcome
this confirmational bias: condition seekingdiscovering the limits for a known
findingand designsearching for a set of conditions that yields previously unseen
results. The condition seeking strategy is a data-centered approach that samples
previously unsampled data points to verify that they agree with the theory under
investigation. The design strategy is a theory-centered approach that looks for
results predicted by the theory under investigation, but not yet observed.
This addresses our Questions One and Two (nothing pertains to Three or Four).
Implicit is the statement that active experiments are more effective than passive
observation, because both suggested experimental strategies involve collecting spe-
cific data as opposed to simply gathering whatever data is around (Question One).
Mostly though, [Greenwald:86] addresses the type of experiment selection bias that
should be used and how that bias should be derived from the theory bias (Question
Two). The confirmational bias must be derived from the "main" hypothesis under
consideration, while the condition seeking and design experiments can either be
exploratory (trying to find the limits under which a phenomenon exists) or they
can be derived from theory bias. If they are derived from a theory bias, then both
are forms of a "disconfirmation" experiment biaslooking for when the theory
is false. Disconfirmation bias is the simplest form of a relevant bias: the learn-
er is trying to find an experiment that will eliminate at least a single hypothesis
(disconfirmation tries to eliminate the only hypothesis under consideration).
[Evertsz:89] investigates how a tutor could diagnose errors in student models
during the learning process. They argue that the tutor must generate one or more
explanations.If there is more than a single explanation, then the tutor must
perform a "critical experiment" by testing the student with a question that will17
eliminate at least one of the models the tutor has of the student behavior.
Again, this states implicitly that active experimentation with a relevant exper-
imental bias is a good bias (Questions One and Two). It does not address either
Question Three (functional hypotheses and experiments were used) or Four.
The above research agrees that active experiments are preferable to passive ob-
servation. What it does not agree on is the best bias for choosing the experiments,
but it does agree that they must be some form of relevant experiment. Structure
was not investigated, neither was the theory formation/experimentation tradeoff.
Now that we have reviewed work in philosophy, history of science, and cog-
nitive science, we will take a much more detailed look at what machine learning
contributed to our work.
2.2Machine Learning
Machine learning is an important part of artificial intelligence interested in the
development of efficient and effective learning algorithms. Once developed, it is
hoped that these learning algorithms can help create autonomous, self-improving
computerscomputers that could learn on their own. To learn, one must gath-
er new information and integrate it into existing knowledge. Although machine
learning researchers have speculated that learning by experimentation would be a
useful method for gaining knowledge of the world [Dietterich:83], the best method
for gathering information under a given set of conditions is currently unknown.
In this work we chose to focus on how a learning system would select the next
experiment to perform. We did this by separating the model for empirical research
into two parts: a theorist which does the learning and an empiricist that gathers
the new information and presents it to the theorist. This was motivated by early
work in learning by [Simon:74], who defined "two space" learning. In this model,
learning is viewed as a cooperative search of two spaces: a space of rules or theories
and a space of examples or data. As examples are gathered, they can help guide18
the search for the correct theory, while the currently held theories can be used to
guide the gathering of more examples.
We will now review the machine learning work relevant to this dissertation.
First, we present the several methods commonly used to evaluate the performance
of a learning system. We then present the work as it relates to each of the four
questions posed in Chapter One. We finish the chapter with a summary.
2.2.1Criteria for Evaluating a Learning System
There are three main ways that machine learning researchers have evaluat-
ed learning systems: exact identification, probably-approximately correct (PAC)
identification, and predictive accuracy.
Exact identification was first introduced by [Go ld:67]. A learning system is
said to exactly identify a space H of hypotheses if there exists a number N such
that, for every hypothesis h in that space, given N or more training examples
for h, the system produces h as its output hypothesis.In other words, given
enough data, the learning system eventually converges on the right answer. Much
theoretical learning research has studied which hypothesis spaces H can be exactly
identified. Other research has focussed instead on finding the smallest value of N
that guarantees exact identification for specific spaces of interest. In particular,
several researchers (e.g., [Angluin:88]) have studied algorithms that can perform
exact identification with N is bounded by some polynomial in the parameters of
H. In summary, there are two measures of a learning algorithm related to exact
identification: (a) what hypothesis spaces can the algorithm exactly identify and
(b) how many training examples (or experiments) are required to exactly identify
H.
The second criterion for evaluating learning systems is probably-approximately
correct or PAC identification. PAC identification is an approximate form of iden-
tification introduced by [Valiant:84J. The approximateness of the identification is
controlled by two parameters: the accuracy parameter E and the confidence pa-19
rameter S. A learning system is said to PAC identify a space H of hypotheses if for
each hypothesis h in H, in time polynomial in 1, 1 and any parameters of H, the
system outputs with probability 1 6 an hypothesis h whose error with respect to
h is less than f. To measure error, it is assumed that there is an unknown but fixed
probability distribution D over the space of all training examples. The training
examples are drawn with replacement according to D as are any examples that
will be used to test h. Hence, the error is the probability that h will produce an
incorrect output on an example drawn at random according to D. Note that the
definition of PAC identification requires that only a polynomial number of training
examples are used by the learning algorithm (this is because each training example
costs unit time to acquire).
As with exact identification, research in PAC identification has addressed two
problems. First, it has studied what hypothesis spaces H can be PAC-identified.
Second, it has measured the number of training examples (or experiments) needed
to PAC-identify particular hypothesis spaces of interest.
The third criterion for evaluating learning systems is the predictive accuracy
of the hypotheses produced by the system. Unlike exact identification and PAC-
identification, this criterion compares algorithms by evaluating their accuracy after
observing a fixed number of training examples.
A related measure can be applied in tasks that do not involve prediction. In
some applications, the knowledge acquired through learning is used by a perfor-
mance system to carry out some task. The quality of the learning algorithm can be
measured by the success of the performance system on its task. Note that under
this criterion, exact (or even PAC) identification may not be required in order to
obtain perfect performance.
This approach to evaluating learning systems in terms of the behavior of a per-
formance system can be extended to so-called reinforcement learning systems. In
reinforcement learning, the learning system must perform problem solving actions
in the domainno training examples are supplied. Instead, after each action, the20
learning system receives a reward (or penalty) based on the quality of the action.
A learning system is judged to be good if it maximizes its reward over its lifetime.
From the perspective of experimentation, reinforcement learning systems have
an opportunity to experiment at each problem solving act.If they choose an
action that has been tried previously (i.e., a conservative strategy), then they can
expect to receive rewards similar to those that were received in the past (assuming
a stable environment).If they choose to try something new, the rewards may
be much less, but new information is gained. Hence, in this situation, there is a
tradeoff between maximizing reward by using what you have already learned versus
performing experiments to learn something new. The cost to overall performance
of experimentation during learning is measured as well as the cost of making errors
after learning is complete. The optimal strategy for trading off experimentation
versus performance is unknown.
In this dissertation, we focus on the first and the second criteria. Specifically,
we measure the number of experiments required to exactly identify an hypothesis
in a given hypothesis space. In some of our meta-experiments, we also measure
the number of experiments required to PAC-identify hypotheses. Our emphasis on
exact identification reflects our interest in modeling scientific inquiry, where the
goal is to determine the truth. For example, although Newton's theory is approx-
imately correct and certainly adequate for nearly all engineering work, scientists
prefer Einstein's general theory of relativity, because it is believed to be right and
Newton's theory is known to be wrong.
Now that we have reviewed the three general evaluation criteria, we examine
how previous machine learning research has addressed the four questions intro-
duced in Chapter One.
2.2.2Question One: Active Experimentation compared to Passive Ob-
servation
Angluin has studied the value of experimentation for exact identification of21
hypotheses. [Angluin:87] defined a teacher/student model where the student could
either passively observe examples or could ask the teacher questions. She consid-
ered several types of queries that the student could make to the teacher. These
queries are of varying power, from simple membership queries (e.g., "is x E X?"),
to very powerful equivalence queries (e.g., "is X' the target concept X?" would
return either yes or an example that is in either X' or X but not in both). A
membership query is like an experiment in which the learning system supplies in-
put values to an unknown system and observes the resulting output. In the case
of membership queries, however, the output is Boolean, whereas for arbitrary un-
known systems, the output could be more complex. Equivalence queries do not
correspond to any kind of experiment considered in this dissertation. Indeed, they
are unavailable to real scientists. However, the effect of equivalence queries can
be obtained by considering a situation in which the learning system is receiving
a stream of examples and must make a prediction for each example. As long as
the predictions are correct, we do not "charge" the learning system for observing
these new examples. However, if the system makes a mistake, then the example is
counted. Such an example is precisely the information returned by an equivalence
query.
[Angluin:87] proves that there are many hypothesis spaces (including k-term
DNF and regular sets) that can be exactly identified from a polynomial number
of membership and equivalence queries but cannot be exactly identified or PAC-
identified from arbitrary training examples. This demonstrates the power of queries
and answers Question One affirmatively (assuming that equivalence queries are
permitted as experiments).
[Angluin:88] extends the above to exact learning of propositional Horn sentences
(similar to PROLOG program clauses) from a teacher. She presents an efficient
algorithm that learns using equivalence queries along with requests for hints. Hints
are "intermediate" information (if trying to find how roads connect between towns
then a request for a hint could be "is town X connected to town Y?" with the22
answer being one of: (a) yes if it was a direct road, (b) no if not connected, or
(c) an intermediate town if there is a path). Thus a large class of pure PROLOG
programs could be learned using queries and hints.
[Angluin:89] shows there is no efficient algorithm than can learn many types
of concepts exactly using only equivalence queries, including many that are PAC
learnable in polynomial time with equivalence queries (that is, it is easier to PAC
learn via equivalence queries than to exactly learn).
The above work by Angluin concludes that active experimentation (through
the use of queries) allows many types of hypotheses to be learned effectively that
cannot be learned via simple observation. One major drawback is that several of
the query types defined by Angluin are "too powerful"they yield a great deal of
information and may not be efficient to implement. An interesting result was that
many times a class of concepts that was not learnable using very powerful queries
became learnable when simple membership queries were also allowed.
[Gasarch:88] modifies Angluin's teacher/student model for learning recursive
functions. He compares this to a passive learner that cannot make queries and
proves that the teacher/student model could solve the halting problem if it could
make first order logic queries with addition and multiplication. He also looks at
weaker query languages and concludes that the more powerful the query language,
the more the learner is capable of learning.
These results are not really surprising. If the experimenter is allowed to perform
powerful enough experiments (make powerful enough queries) then the learner can
effectively learn any concept.
Now that we have considered work on experimentation and exact identification,
let us turn to the work of [Amsterdam:88], who explores experimentation and PAC
identification. Like Angluin, Amsterdam studies the question of whether experi-
mentation allows a learner to identify hypothesis spaces that cannot be identified
from training examples alone. To conduct an experiment in Amsterdam's model,
the learning system specifies the input values to the unknown system, much like a23
membership query. However, unlike a membership query, if the chosen input values
lie in a region of the input space having zero probability according to the underly-
ing probability distribution D, then the symbol "none" is returned to the learning
system. Otherwise, the output of the unknown system is given (as in a member-
ship query). Amsterdam also permits the learning system to specify a region of
the input space, in which case, assuming the region has non-zero probability, a
training example is drawn at random according to D within that region.
Amsterdam was unable to obtain a general answer to the question of whether
there exist hypothesis spaces that can be PAC-identified with experiments but
not without experiments. However, for cases where the underlying probability
distribution D over the space of examples is everywhere non-zero, he proved that
experiments do expand the collection of learnable hypothesis spaces. Hence, this
work answers Question One affirmatively for this special case. Unfortunately, it is
quite common for the underlying distribution D to have zero-probability regions,
so this result is not as strong as one would like.
In summary, all the work agrees that active experimentation is beneficial, allow-
ing many classes of hypotheses to be efficiently learned that could not be learned
from passive observation alone. Unfortunately, all this work was only interested in
identifiability of the class of target hypotheses. As such, all algorithms are classi-
fied as either "effective" or "intractable." In contrast, for this dissertation we are
more interested in a quantitative measure of the speed-up in learning that active
experimentation brings.
2.2.3Question Two: Which Experiment Bias to Use
In a study quite similar to our own, [Buchanan:88] investigated how to choose
the most effective training examples to teach a learning system. They worked with
a teacher/student paradigm where the teacher was attempting to choose the best
examples to present to the student (where best means "converging to a mostly
correct hypothesis quickest"). Hence, their criterion for evaluating an experiment24
bias is similar to ours. They investigated three learning situations: (1) the teacher
had full knowledge of target theory but no knowledge of the student's evolving
theory (close to the typical case with human learning), (2) the teacher had full
knowledge of target theory and of the evolving theory of student (i.e., the teacher
was like our oracle), and (3) the teacher had no knowledge of the target or evolving
theories (so it had to select examples randomly). Only functional experiments and
hypotheses were considered, and it was assumed that the student is considering an
hypothesis space containing only logical conjunctions.
For cases (1) and (2), where the teacher knows the target concept, it is possible
for the teacher to select examples that are either positive examples, near misses
(negative examples with exactly one incorrect feature), or solid misses (negative
examples with more than one incorrect feature). One question explored in their
study was whether near miss negative examples were better than solid misses.
Their conclusion was that near miss negative examples are more informative
for the case where the learner employs a conjunctive hypothesis space. In such a
space, a near miss negative example will eliminate more incorrect hypotheses than
a far miss example. They also conclude, of course, that experiments should at a
minimum be chosen to eliminate at least one hypothesis from consideration (i.e.,
the experiments should be relevant). Far miss examples may fail to be relevant if
the only hypotheses they affect have already been eliminated, whereas this cannot
happen with near misses.
Unfortunately, the conclusions of this paper are only relevant to situations
where a teacher is selecting examples. A learning system, by itself, cannot tell
whether a proposed experiment will be a near miss example, a far miss example,
or a positive example. Hence, this work has little bearing on our research.
[Christiansen:90] describes a robot that learns to move a puck from one sector of
a square tray to another. Each move is accomplished by tilting the tray at a selected
angle for a fixed period of time. The goal of the robot is to become skilled at moving
the puck reliably from any given sector of the tray to any other. Unfortunately,25
the actions available to the robot (i.e., selecting the angle of the tilt) are non-
deterministic because of friction, noise, and quantization errors. Indeed, the "real
world" in this domain can be modeled by a stochastic finite state automaton. The
states of this automaton are the sectors of the tray. Each arc connecting these
states is labeled with the action performed by the robot and the probability that
the action will cause a state transition along the specified arc. If the robot knew
this automaton, it could search for a sequence of high-probability state transitions
(i.e., puck movements) from the starting quadrant to the goal sector, and thus
produce a highly reliable plan.
Hence, one approach to becoming skilled at moving the puck is to acquire
this stochastic finite state automaton by performing experiments to estimate the
probabilities on each arc. However, a little thought shows that it is not essential
to learn accurately the probabilities on every arc. What is important is to find a
subset of the arcs whose probabilities are high and that can be combined to provide
a path from every sector to every other sector. With this reliable arc subset, the
robot can successfully move the puckso none of the other arcs is needed.
Christiansen developed and compared two different experimentation strategies
for finding these high-probability arcs: "random" selection and "strategic" selec-
tion. Under random selection, the robot takes the given start and goal quadrants
and searches its current stochastic automaton for a path having a high probability
of success.If one is found, the path is executed. However, if a high probability
path is not found, random actions are executed until the goal is reached.
Under strategic selection, the robot also first attempts to find a high probability
path using its current stochastic automaton. If such a path is found, it is executed.
If a path of very low probability is found, then random actions are performed.
However, if a path of intermediate probability is found, the robot executes the
path until it reaches the lowest probability step in that path. At that point, it
chooses an action at random. This strategy attempts to find ways of strengthening
an almost-reliable path so that it can become a reliable one.26
Christiansen found that strategic selection produced faster learning and pro-
duced asymptotically better performance. In the following chapters, we also show
that more clever experiment selection produces faster learning.However, it is
difficult to compare Christiansen's results to ours for two reasons.
First, Christiansen evaluates his system based on its problem-solving perfor-
mance rather than on the accuracy of the learned theory (i.e., the stochastic au-
tomaton) or the number of steps required to obtain an accurate theory, which are
the criteria we consider. Second, his training examples are noisy and his hypothe-
ses are stochastic. This means that our notion of "relevant" experiment does not
apply very well. In a sense, no experiment is relevant, because no single experiment
is guaranteed to eliminate an hypothesis from further consideration (unless an hy-
pothesis contains an arc of zero probability). In another sense, every experiment
is relevant, because every experiment will acquire some new information (unless
all hypotheses, including the correct one, assign a particular arc probability 1).
Despite these differences, Christiansen's work confirms our finding that clever
selection of experiments is superior to random selection.
2.2.4Question Three: Decompositional Access Experiments
Very few systems have dealt with structural hypotheses or experiments. One
of the few examples is [Rajamoney:85, Rajamoney:88], who proposed a model that
used structural experiments to detect and correct errors in an incorrect theory em-
bedded in a performance system. While performing its normal tasks, the system
would notice when its predictions were inconsistent with observations. It would
propose one or more changes in the current theory that would explain the incon-
sistent observation. Finally, it would design experiments that would eliminate at
least one hypothesis, then performs these experiments until a single hypothesis re-
mained (consistent with all past data) or until no more experiments were possible.
This is an active experimentation system that uses a mix of both structural
and functional hypotheses and experiments. The experiment bias is implicit in the27
dependency structures that are built into the theories used, so when an experi-
ment is chosen, the system finds the "most relevant" experiment based on these
dependencies. The theory formation/experimentation tradeoff is simply managed:
experiments are only performed when a failure in a theory is detected. If the theory
is predicting correctly, no experiments are ever performed.
2.2.5Question Four: Tradeoffs of Theory Formation Versus Experi-
mentation
No previous work has systematically investigated the tradeoff between theory
formation and experimentation. The great majority of learning systems use what
could be called the "single-theory" approach. They maintain a single current
theory and continue to use it as long as it is succeeding. When it fails, one or
more alternative theories are generated to explain the failure, and experiments
are chosen to discriminate among these alternative theories. The results reported
later in this dissertation suggest that this is an excellent, computationally efficient
strategy.
The primary exception to this "single theory" approach is the work on version
space learning [mitchell:83]. The version space is the space of all hypotheses con-
sistent with the training data (and with the restricted hypothesis space bias of the
learning system). For some hypothesis spaces (e.g., Boolean conjunctions), it can
be compactly represented by two subsets: the set of maximally specific hypotheses
(called the S set) and the set of maximally general hypotheses (called the G set).
Experiments can be selected that "split" the S and G sets in half, and hence, that
are likely to be maximally informative.
Related work by [Subramanian:86] showed how in some circumstances a ver-
sion space could be factored into component version spaces. Good discriminating
experiments could then be designed efficiently by analyzing the S and G sets of
the component version spaces.
The results reported below suggest that the careful selection of experiments28
using methods similar to the version space approach does not lead to significantly
faster learning.Hence, a conclusion of this dissertation is that the additional
complications of maintaining and factoring version spaces may not be worth the
benefit.
2.3Summary
In summary, the work reviewed here suggests the following about our four
questions.
Question One: Active or Passive.
Previous research suggests that active experimentation is a faster, more ef-
fective learning method than passive observation. All of this work has been
qualitative; in Chapter Four, we investigate what the differences are quanti-
tatively.
Question Two: Experiment Bias.
Again, almost all previous research agrees that relevant experiments of some
sort (i.e., experiments guaranteed to eliminate at least one hypothesis) are
good. In Chapter Five, we investigate how several types of relevance strate-
gies compare, including very complex and very simple strategies. We also
compare these to a random selector and an idealized oracle. Again, quanti-
tative comparison is our goal.
Question Three: Structural or Functional Experiments.
Very little has been done here. It is obvious that for learning the structure
of an unknown system, it is usually necessary to perform structural access
experiments, but it is far from obvious that such experiments are necessary
for effective learning of the function of an unknown system.
Question Four: Theory Formation/Experimentation Tradeoffs.
Again, very little direction comes from previous research.Most systems29
use failure to drive the experiment selection, although it is often speculated
that exploratory experiments can be very helpful. No single study can fully
address this question, but we do provide some direction based on our work.
In summary, previous work has addressed Questions One and Two qualitatively
or only in terms of the learnability of hypothesis spaces. Our goal is to provide
quantitative measures of the utility of experimentation and of the value of alter-
native experimentation strategies in terms of the speed of learning. Very little
work has addressed Questions Three and Four. Existing systems can be viewed
as single data points concerning structural experiments and the tradeoff between
theory formation and experimentation. We are not able to completely answer these
questions, but our goal is to provide more insight into them through systematic
study.
Now that we have reviewed previous work, we turn our attention to the meta-
experimental methodology employed in this dissertation. This is followed by de-
scriptions of the three meta-experiments that we performed. Finally, we summarize
our conclusions and discuss future research.30
Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter describes our simplifying assumptions and overall methodology for
studying empirical research. Each following chapter describes one meta-experiment
we performed along with the modifications and specializations to the methodology
in this chapter.
3.1Modeling Empirical Research
We model empirical research as shown in Figure 2, breaking it into two sub-
parts: the theorist and the empiricist.The theorist is a learning system that
analyzes and integrates the incoming training examples into its existing knowledge
about the unknown system. The empiricist is a training example selector that
either passively collects training examples from the unknown system (which is
controlled by the environment or an outside agent) or actively collects its own
training examples by performing experiments on the unknown system.
For the rest of this dissertation, we will refer to the theorist as the learning
component of the research model and the empiricist as the training example se-
lector that provides information to the learning component. We now look at a
system analysis of empirical research, then describe the learning component and
the training example selector in more detail. We finish with a description of how
the results are evaluated.Empiricist Empiricist
Training Example Selector
(Unknown
System
Environment
or
Oracle
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Figure 2. Simplified Models of an Active Experimenter and a Passive Observer.
3.1.1Systems Analysis of Empirical Research
In Chapter One we briefly described our model of the empirical research process.
In this section, we want to reconsider that model to determine how general it is
and what assumptions it embodies.
To do this, let us begin by performing what we call a "systems analysis" of
scientific experimentation. Experiments involve manipulation and observation of
some aspect of the world.Typically these manipulations and observations are
performed with the aid of instruments and experimental apparatus, and they take
place within some environment or context. To perform a systems analysis, we
define a collection of systems and then consider various ways in which those systems
can be arranged. Each system is defined by the boundary separating it from its
environment and by the inputs and outputs that can flow across this boundary.
To begin with, let us define three systems. The first system will consist of
the instruments, apparatus, and observer, and we will start by assuming that it is
known and well-understood. The second system will be the target of the scientific
investigation. It is incompletely known, so the goal of the investigation is to learn
more about it.Finally, the third system will be the environment, in which the
other two systems are embedded.
There are three ways these systems can be configured (See Figure 3). First, theConfiguration #1 Configuration #2
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Figure 3. Example of the Three Types of Experimental Configuration.
unknown system can be completely embedded inside the known system (including
instruments and apparatus). In this configuration, the experimenter has complete
control over all inputs and outputs from the unknown system. For example, we
might study a chemical reaction inside a test tube. Inputs to this unknown system
could include temperature, pressure, light, and so on. The outputs of the system
could include heat, gases, light, and so on. This is generally called in vitro ex-
perimentation (literally, "in glass"), and it is the kind that is investigated in this
dissertation.
In the second configuration, the known system is completely embedded inside
the unknown system. For example, when we send a space probe to Mars, the
probe is embedded in the Martian atmosphere The probe can send "inputs" into
the atmosphere and measure "outputs" from the atmosphere, but we generally
think about this in terms of how the atmosphere affects the probe rather than
the reverse. Similar kinds of experiments occur when organisms or chemicals are
imported into an ecosystem. In this configuration, the known system has relatively
little control over the unknown system.
Finally, in the third configuration, the known and unknown systems are dis-
joint, and both are contained in the environment. This third configuration can be
subdivided into three cases. In the first case, the experimenter is able to observe
(but not control) all inputs into the unknown system. We will call this pure ob-
servational investigation. The scientist must rely on the environment to "choose"
the inputs to the unknown system.33
In the second case, the experimenter can control some of the inputs to the
unknown system, and he/she can observe the remaining inputs. Hence, although
only some of the inputs to the unknown system may be controlled, they all can be
tracked. This is a mix of in vitro and observational experimentation.
Finally, in the third case, there are inputs to the unknown system that cannot
even be observed by the experimenter. In these cases, completely controlled ex-
perimentation is impossible. However, if these extra inputs from the environment
have a relatively minor effect on the behavior of the unknown system, it may be
possible to regard them as sources of random error and overcome them via repeated
measurements over time.
In this dissertation, we consider only pure in vitro experimentation and pure
observational investigation. This means that we are not considering the experi-
mental procedures especially designed for cases two and three of the final configu-
ration. In these cases, one experimental tactic is to employ two identical instances
of the unknown system. Both instances are embedded in the same environment
and treated in exactly the same ways, with the exception that different values are
placed on some of the controllable inputs of the two systems. The hope is that
any uncontrolled (and possibly unobserved) inputs to the two unknown systems
are identical, so that any observed differences in outputs can be attributed to the
differences in the inputs. This tactic only works when it is possible to create two
identical instances of the unknown system.
In situations where "cloning" the unknown system is not possible, another
approach is to conduct a longitudinal study. The inputs to the unknown system
are varied over time, and it is assumed (hoped) that unknown and unobserved
inputs from the environment change very slowly so that they remain constant for
the duration of the experiment.
Other approaches can be employed when many similar, but not identical in-
stances of the unknown system exist. Psychologists call this the problem of indi-
vidual differences, and they generally employ many similar unknown systems to34
gather statistical information about the relationship between controllable inputs
and observable outputs.
These techniques become even more complex if the unknown systems retain
state, so that they are affected by their prior inputs. In such cases, factorial and
counter-balanced designs are required.
This discussion points out the importance of experiment design (i.e., the activ-
ity of constructing a proper configuration of known and unknown systems). We
do not study this task in this dissertation, but it is clearly a critical part of the
process of scientific exploration.
Our systems analysis thus far has focused on the ability of the experimenter
to control the inputs to the unknown system. Let us now elaborate this analysis
to look more carefully at the problem of noise and other sources of error. To do
this, let us model the experimenter, the instrumentation for manipulating input-
s, and the instrumentation for observing outputs as three separate systems.If
we incorporate this subdivision into each of the system configurations discussed
above, we see that the experimenter is no longer able to interact directly with the
unknown system. Rather, these interactions are mediated by instruments. If the
behavior of these instruments is completely understood by the experimenter, then
the situation is unchanged. However, if the experimenter has an incorrect theory
of the instruments, then whenever the behavior of the instruments departs from
this theory, the experimenter considers this to be "noise" or measurement error.
These errors are often normally distributed about the value predicted by the
experimenter's theory of the instrument.In such cases, repeated independent
measurements can overcome these measurement errors. On the other hand, if the
experimenter's theory is seriously flawed, then systematic errors will result.
In this dissertation, we assume that there are no sources of error or noise.
Hence, all inputs are set correctly, and all outputs are observed correctly.
Now that we have discussed experimental control and noise, the last topic
we must consider is whether the unknown system contains state information. A35
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Figure 4. Modeling an Unknown System that has Internal State.
This is an unknown system E with observable internal state 1. It can be viewed as a function
E(et, = where the internal state / is not directly controllable.
system E contains state information if, for some fixed and complete set of inputs x,
E(x) returns different values on different occasions. For example the brain waves
generated from the presentation of a visual stimulus to the eyes depend on the
internal state of that brain (e.g., awake, asleep, or drugged). In situations where
the experimenter cannot observe or control all inputs to the unknown system, it
is impossible to distinguish the case where E contains internal state from the case
where E is receiving additional input information from the environment.
The internal state of a system may be either observable or unobservable. When
a system contains unobservable state, the task of modeling it is quite difficult
[Angluin:87b, Rivest:87, Rivest:89]. Indeed, it is computationally intractable to
form an approximately correct theory of a finite-state machine by observing only
its inputs and outputs [Pitt:89].
Even when the state of the system is observable (see Figure 4), it may still be
impossible to manipulate the controllable inputs of E to drive the system into a
desired state. Hence, it may be very difficult to obtain a complete model of E from
experiments.
Because of these difficulties, we will assume in this dissertation that the un-
known system is state-free. In Chapter Seven we discuss how unknown systems
with internal state might affect our results.
Finally, notice that experiment order is unimportant when studying state-free
systems (because the outcome of an experiment does not depend on the experi-
ments performed earlier). This made several implementation problems tractable
(e.g., to determine the minimal number of experiments needed for any given learn-Unknown
System Function
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Figure 5. Example of the Functional and Structural Domain.
Above is an example of one binary function and two structures that implement that function.
An alternate representation for the binary function is shown below it. We call this a result table
because it is a table of all possible input values and their associated results. The two structures
shown were generated using the method detailed in Chapter Six.
ing problem we only needed to investigate the power set of k experiments, which
is size 2', instead of all k! experiment sequences).
This concludes the system analysis of empirical research. Next we look at how
we chose to model the unknown and known systems.
3.1.2The Unknown System
For this study we draw unknown systems from two related domains: one func-
tional and one structural. We will discuss the functional domain now and postpone
introduction of the structural domain until Chapter Six.
The functional domain consists of the binary functions
B: 10,11n{0,1}m.
A functional training exampleg) consists of the input value I E {0,1}nand its
associated output value g. E(i) E {0,1}"`. For the functional learning task, an
hypothesis is represented as a table of training examplesa result tablewhere
performing an experiment i can be simulated by looking up the associated output
value g in the result table. Result tables for binary functions are also called truth
tables.37
We now look at how the learning component uses these training examples,
followed by how the training example selector chooses them.
3.1.3The Learning Component
Since we wish to study the behavior of the learning component under differing
training example selectors, we employ a very simple learning model. This guar-
antees that differences in performance are attributable to the training example
selector and not to some hidden bias of the learning component or some interac-
tion between the learning component and the experiment selector.
Learning Component GC(Ht,(it, -WO):
Given:Ht = set of hypotheses not ruled out at time t;
(it, gt)= training example consisting of:
= input to unknown system E at time t,
gt = E(it), the experimental result.
Find:Ht+1= (it, -WO),
= All hypotheses h E Hi consistent with (it, gt)
Any implementation of the learning component must deal with data interpreta-
tion, theory formation, and hypothesis update in light of new information. It must
also employ some stopping criterion enabling the learning component to notify the
researcher that the unknown system is understood. We discuss how each of these
issues was dealt with next.
Data Interpretation
The data interpretation problem is "given the input values x and the resultant
values g, what were the actual values present at the input and output of E?" A
researcher rarely has direct access to the unknown system E, so has to infer the
actual values a and fromfrom the measured values x and g (see Figure 6). For example,
when a virus infects a host cell, you cannot directly observe the sequence of DNA38
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Figure 6. The Data Interpretation Problem.
When experimenting on an unknown system E, input values E normally cannot be placed
directly on the inputs of E and the outputs g normally cannot be monitored directly at the
output of E. The data interpretation problem is "given the input values x and the resultant
values g what were the actual values a and b present at the input and output of E?"
the virus inserts into that host's DNA sequence. Instead you must infect the host
cell with the virus (Y) and observe how the progeny of this cell are affected (y).
From this you try to infer what DNA sequence the virus carried (c1) and where it
ti
was inserted into the host cell's DNA (s).
For this work, we define=and gg, allowing us to avoid data interpreta-
tion. We discuss how this affects our results in Chapter Seven.
Theory Formation and Hypothesis Space Update
In general, theory formation and hypothesis space update are not well under-
stood. With most learning systems, the hypothesis space is never explicitly enu-
merated. Instead a small number of plausible hypotheses are generated and later
modified (or discarded and new ones generated) as information becomes available.
Indeed, some learning systems (e.g., [Kibler:87, Haussler:88]) never explicitly gen-
erate any hypotheses.
However, every learning system can be viewed as considering (if only implic-
itly) some space of possible hypothesesnamely the space of all hypotheses that
could be produced by the learning system for some sequence of training examples.
Hence, in our meta-experiments, we have employed a particularly simple learning
algorithm. We present the learning component with a pre-enumerated set of all
hypotheses it must consider. The unknown system is always in this set. Hypothe-39
sis space update is simply a matter of removing from consideration any hypothesis
inconsistent with observed training examples. No hypotheses need to be generated
or modified during the learning process.
Theory Bias
One way the researcher could model an unknown system would be to perform
all possible experiments and create a table of all these experiments and their asso-
ciated resultsa result tablethat totally characterizes that unknown system. No
intermediate hypotheses would be necessary, all the researcher needs is knowledge
of what all the system inputs are. Unfortunately, this is impossible in most cases
(e.g., continuous or infinite domains), and impractical in almost all cases. In reali-
ty a learning system works with partial knowledge of the behavior of the unknown
system and must model the system by making a generalization from this incom-
plete knowledge. Only if the learning system uses some other source of knowledge,
or bias, can it make an informed generalization based on incomplete information
[Mit chell: 80).
Machine learning traditionally employs two kinds of theory bias in learning
systems: restricted hypothesis space bias and preference bias. The restricted hy-
pothesis space bias limits the number and type of hypotheses the learning compo-
nent can consider, defining exactly which hypotheses are possible. In our learning
component, this bias is implemented by providing the initial set of hypotheses, H,
to the learner. Any hypothesis not in the set cannot be learned, while all items
in the set must be considered by the learning component. When constructing this
set, two factors must be considered: (1) the number of hypotheses in the initial
hypothesis space and (2) what super-space this initial hypothesis space is drawn
from. We go into details about these two factors later (Chapters Four through
Six).
A preference bias informs the learning system which hypotheses to "prefer"
over others, based on which hypotheses are more likely to be correct. Thus given40
Table 1. Example of the Learning Component Task.
System Inputs
A B
Current
h1h2
Hypothesis
h3h4
Space
h5h6
0 0 0 1 00 1 1
0 1 000 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 000 1
1 1 0000 00
The learning component attempts to discover the function of an unknown system, which is
known to be one of the hypotheses {h1-N} (shown above as a group of result tables). h1 is
the hypothesis that (00,0) (01,0), (10,1), and (11,0), where (00,0) means that performing the
experiment i = (00) (input A=0 and input B=0) produces the output y = 0. By accepting
training examplesinput values for A and B with the unknown system resultand eliminating
hypotheses that are inconsistent with that training example, the learning component will
eventually achieve its stopping criterion (for exact learning it will eliminate all but one
hypothesis, assumed to be the function performed by the unknown system). At this point the
learning component has finished learning. For example, if the training example is (00,0), this
forces the learner to eliminate h2, h5 and h6 from its hypothesis space.
the restricted hypothesis space, preference bias orders these hypotheses from most
likely to least likely (based on some set of criteria). This bias has two roles: (1)
guiding experiment selection and (2) predicting unseen training examples. Prefer-
ence bias can guide experiment selection by focusing the training example selector
on the most likely hypotheses, allowing the selector to ignore unlikely hypotheses.
A learning system often has to demonstrate what it has learned (as when a teach-
er tests a student). If there are several hypotheses, all predicting different results
for a given input, the preference bias can be used to resolve these conflicts (e.g.,
the learning system could use the most highly preferred hypothesis when asked to
make predictions). We implement preference bias as a prior probability distribu-
tion over the hypothesis space (each hypothesis has an associated probability and
the hypothesis with the highest prior probability is preferred).
Stopping Criterion
The stopping criterion determines when the learning system has understood the
unknown system and can "stop learning." The most common criteria are learning
in an engineering sense"...if I can normally predict the actions of the unknown41
system to within specific tolerances..."and learning in a scientific sense"...if I
have learned exactly the unknown system..." We investigate both.
As we described in Chapter Two, the most popular engineering-sense stopping
criterion in machine learning is called probably approximately correct (PAC) learn-
ing [Valiant:84]. A PAC algorithm is one that, with high probability, produces an
output hypothesis h that is approximately correct. Another way of saying this is
that a PAC algorithm halts when there is high probability that all hypotheses still
remaining in its hypothesis space are approximately correct. The probability is
measured over all possible sets of training examples.
Due to differences in the way our learning component and PAC learning are
defined, we cannot use the PAC model. We can use a stopping criterion that is "in
the spirit of" PACwe call this GERR learning (Good Enough for Rock and Roll).
A GERR algorithm halts when a high proportion of the hypotheses remaining in
its hypotheses space H are approximately correct. More formally, we define the
error rate of a hypothesis h E H to be the proportion of possible input values
for which h(s) # E(1'). We let e be the largest error rate we are willing to tolerate
and still consider an hypothesis correct, and we let 1b be the desired proportion
of H that must be approximately correct. For example, an unknown system that
is GERR learned at 8 = 0.25 and e = 0.10 says that at least 75% of the hypotheses
are at least 90% correct.
Exact learning is closer to what science attempts to achieveabsolute total
correctness. The learning component stops when there is exactly one hypothesis
h E H consistent with the training examples. By definition of our learning problem,
the unknown system is always one of the initial hypotheses. Hence this single
remaining hypothesis must be the unknown system. Table 1 is an example of how
the learning component operates.
3.1.4The Training Example Selector
The learning component of the research model is dependent on the training ex-42
ample selector to provide new information about the input/output behavior of the
unknown system. The selector takes an input value x, presents it to the unknown
system E, and observes the associated output value y = E(x) yielding a training
example0. The selector can either be passive (not under researcher control)
or active (under researcher control). We describe several passive observers and a
very simple active experimenter in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five we describe sev-
eral, much more "clever" active experimenters. We postpone the details of these
selectors until the appropriate chapter.
We have presented a model of empirical research. First we performed a system
analysis of empirical research which discussed environmental control, experimen-
tal error, internal state, and the domain of study. We then defined the learning
component and how it deals with data interpretation, theory formation, theory
bias, and stopping criterion. We mentioned that a training example selector can
be either passive (an observer) or active (an experimenter), but postponed details
of our models until Chapter Four. To conclude this chapter, we present how we
intend to evaluate these models when performing the meta-experiments.
3.2Evaluating the Results
In this dissertation we are searching for training example selectors that maxi-
mize the overall effectiveness of empirical research (within our model). We evaluate
the overall effectiveness of a training example selector in three ways: (1) its per-
formance as measured by the convergence speed of the learning component; (2) its
robustness when the learning component bias is altered; and (3) its computational
cost when selecting a training example. We look at each of these next.
Performance
The purpose of the training example selector is to gather information for the
learning component. The faster a learning component converges, the better the43
training example sequence must have been. We measure the performance of train-
ing example selectors by counting the number of training examples presented to the
learning component before it met its stopping criterion. By holding the learning
component and its initial conditions (initial hypothesis set and unknown system)
constant while varying the training example selector, we can determine which se-
lectors are most effective.
Robustness
Another reasonable requirement for a training example selector is that it be
robust across different learning components and initial conditions. We investigate
this by holding the training example selector constant and changing the learning
component bias, the initial hypothesis space, and the unknown system. By measur-
ing the standard deviation of the average performance, we can rank how robust the
different selectors arethe smaller the standard deviation, the more consistent, or
robust, the selector is when providing training examples to a learning component.
Computational Cost
Any computational method will have an associated computational cost. Part
of evaluating the effectiveness of a method is to determine if its cost is within
acceptable boundsthat the method is tractable. We postpone discussion of com-
putational cost until actual analysis of the training example selectors (in Chapter's
Four through Six).
This concludes the overall meta-experimental and experimental description.
By using the training example selector and the learning component in the research
model of Figure 2, we can perform a comparative study of the effectiveness of
several passive and active research strategies. This provides the empirical evidence
needed to address each of the four questions of Chapter One. We now look at the
three meta-experiments performed on the research model.44
Chapter 4
Meta-Experiment 1: Effect of Control over an
Unknown System
In the previous chapter we introduced a model of empirical research. It con-
sisted of two subparts: a theorist and an empiricist. The theorist was the learning
component of the research model and the empiricist was the training example
source for that learning component.
This chapter investigates the difference between learning from passively and
actively collected training examples. We compare a passive observer placed in
three different environments against a simple active experimenter and an oracle.
By comparing performance, robustness, and computational cost, we can discover
which training example selection method is most effective.
First, we describe the different training example selectors (active and passive)
and how they were implemented. Second, we detail the theory bias and stopping
criteria used by the learning component. Third, we present the methodology for
this meta-experiment.Finally, after an aside to describe how the results were
analyzed, we present those results.
4.1The Training Example Selectors
To investigate the performance, we changed the training example selector while
holding the learning component constant. In this section we define our active and45
passive training example selectors, presenting details of three systems: the passive
observer, the oracle, and the active experimenter.
Passive Observation
A passive observer must wait for training examples, gathering them as they oc-
cur. There are two problems with this: (a) the same training example may occur
multiple times, and (b) some examples may never occur. We study these prob-
lems by placing the passive observer in three simulated environments, each with
a different distribution of training examples. This yields three passive observation
situations, which we callURANDOM, BRANDOM,andCRANDOM.
URANDOMis supplied training examples (with replacement) from a uniform
random distribution. It simulates a passive observer watching an unknown
system where all training examples are equiprobable, which is the best pos-
sible situation for an observer. That is, the observed input values xi
are uniformly distributed (Vi,j : P(4) = P(4)) and may be repeated.
URANDOMwas implemented by choosing at random (with replacement) from
the set of all possible input valuesuntil every possible value was selected at
least once. Each of these was then paired up with the associated experimental
result g to form a sequence of training examples, which was then presented
to the learning component.
BRANDOMis supplied training examples (with replacement) from a binomial
distribution.It simulates a passive observer watching an unknown system
where all training examples occur, but where some have a much higher chance
of appearing than others. That is, the observed input values are
binomially distributed and may be repeated.
BRANDOMwas implemented by choosing from the sum of two uniform ran-
dom variables between 0 and a:2U until every possible input value "i was46
selected at least once. Each of these was then paired up with the correspond-
ing experimental result y to form a sequence of training examples, which was
then presented to the learning component.
CRANDOM is supplied training examples from a uniform random distribution
(like URANDOM) but with some number k of thevalues removed from
consideration.This simulates a passive observer studying a phenomenon
where some data points never occur. If there are 2" input values possible
and you wish k values removed from consideration then k randomly-chosen
values have zero probability of occurring and the remaining values
are uniformly distributed.
CRANDOM was implemented by removing k of the possible input values
then choosing at random (with replacement) from the remaining input values
until every possible value was selected at least once. Each of these was then
paired up with the corresponding experimental result g to form a sequence
of training examples, which was then presented to the learning component.
CRANDOM presents a problem for the learning component: if two hypotheses
under consideration differ only in the result of an unavailable data point, the
learning component cannot distinguish between them (they look identical for
all available experiments). We call any such hypothesis space unlearnable for
the given missing experiments. An hypothesis space is unlearnable if, for
a missing input value 4, there exist two hypotheses hi, hn, E H such that
for all inputs 4)h/(4) = h,,,(4) and I/1(4) # 16,(4) (where
= h(I) means that hypothesis h predicts a result of g for an input of 4
We gathered information on what proportion of a given hypothesis space size
was unlearnable and what the residual size of these unlearnable spaces was.
We also placed the passive observer in an actively helpful environment; one
that presented carefully-selected training examples to the observer (e.g., a teacher
tutoring a student). We called this passive observation situation ORACLE.47
ORACLE provides the passive observer with the training example sequence
that most effectively isolates the correct hypothesis, forcing the learning com-
ponent to converge as fast as possible. This is used as a baseline value, show-
ing the best any learning system could perform for a given learning problem.
To do this the ORACLE must be able to exactly predict the behavior of the
learning component at all times, as well as know what the unknown system
E is.
ORACLE was implemented by exhaustively searching all possible experiment
subsets to discover a minimal length experiment sequence for a given un-
known system in a given hypothesis space. The i values from this sequence
were then paired up with the corresponding experimental results #, form-
ing a sequence of training examples, which was presented to the learning
component.
Active Experimentation
In active experimentation, the empiricist must select its own training examples.
How these training examples are selected is the main issue of active experimen-
tation. We present a very simple active experiment selector, which we called
RANDOM, and postpone intelligent selection techniques until Chapter Five.
RANDOM is a simple active training example selector. It simulates an exper-
imenter attempting to avoid the problems of passive observationneedless
repetition of some training examples and lack of other training examples.
This can be considered a "worst case active experiment selector"; experi-
ment selection is not based on any knowledge of the learning component.
RANDOM was implemented by selecting at random (without replacement)
from the set of all experiments i until each had been selected.Each of
these was then paired up with the corresponding experimental result g to48
form a sequence of training examples, which was presented to the learning
component.
Next we look at how the learning component was varied to investigate the
robustness of the above training example selectors.
4.2The Learning Component
To investigate the robustness of each training example selector, we altered the
learning component while holding the training example selector constant. With
the selectors introduced above, only the restricted hypothesis space bias and the
stopping criterion can affect the selector (no selector uses knowledge internal to the
learner, so preference bias cannot have an effect). We look at restricted hypothesis
space bias and learning component stopping criterion next.
4.2.1Restricted Hypothesis Space Bias
As presented in Chapter Three, the restricted hypothesis space bias limits the
size and type of the initial hypothesis space presented to the learning component.
We selected three different "types" of hypothesis space: arbitrary binary functions,
1-term disjunctive normal form (1-term DNF), and 1 decision lists (1-DL).
The first is the set of all binary functions 13:{0, 1}n 1-4 {0, 1}", for a given
value of n and m. There are 2' distinct input values and 2' distinct output values.
Initial hypothesis spaces were randomly chosen from all hypotheses for given values
of n and m.
The other two (1-term DNF and 1-DL) are subsets of these binary functions
that can be represented in particular ways. The class 1-term-DNF is probably
the simplest non-trivial hypothesis space investigated in machine learning. It has
a very simple learning algorithm, it is well-understood theoretically [Kearns:87,
Haussler:88b1, and it has played a role in several practical learning methods
[Winston:75, Dietterich:81]. The class of 1-DL is a special case of the class of49
decision lists introduced by [Rivest:87]. It is one of the largest efficiently learnable
Boolean hypothesis spaces, and there are effective algorithms for decision lists
[Clark:89, Pagallo:90]. To define these two subspaces, we must take a slight aside
to present the terminology required (for more detail about either, see [Rivest:87]).
1-term-DNF is a restricted type of disjunctive normal form (DNF). In general,
DNF expressions are defined over n Boolean variables xi E {0, 1}, where 0 is
interpreted as false and 1 is interpreted as true. These variables are combined
using the three standard logical connectives: AND ( A ), OR ( V ), and NOT ().
They are defined such that x1 A x2 = 1 if and only if (iff) x1 = 1 and x2 = 1,
xi V x2 = 1 iff xi = 1 or x2 = 1 (or both), and --,x1 = 1 iff xi = O. A literalis
either a variable xi or its negation A conjunction c3 is a collection of literals
joined by A :11 A /2 A... Alk. A disjunctive normal form (DNF) expression
is a disjunction of conjunctions: c1 V c2 V...V c,. The class of 1-term-DNF
expressions consists of DNF expressions containing only one conjunction.
The hypotheses in 1-DL do not have simple representations as Boolean formu-
las. Instead, they are conveniently represented as a list of pairs ((/1,v1),...,(4,v,.)),
where each /i is a literal and each vi E {0,1}. This list is called a decision list,
because it is scanned in much the same way as a continued if-then-else expression
in programming languages. First, 11 is tested. If it is true, then v1 is the value
of the Boolean function. Otherwise, 12 is tested, and so on. By convention, Ir
is always true (i.e., 1), so vr is the default value for the decision list.Arbitrary
decision lists permit arbitrary conjunctions to appear as tests, while 1-DL restricts
the tests to be simple literals (conjunctions of length 1).
4.2.2Stopping Criteria
Both stopping criteria from Chapter Three were investigated: exact learning
and GERR learning. The learning component had to find a single unique hypoth-
esis under the exact criterion, while under the GERR criterion 90% of the time it
had to be correct in all but one training example prediction (in GERR terminology50
S = 0.10 and e =
This completes our description of the passive and active training example se-
lectors used for this meta-experiment. Details of the learning component were
also presented. Next we describe the actual meta-experiment, which attempts to
determine if active experimentation is more effective than passive observation.
4.3Methodology
The basic operation performed in this meta-experiment we call a trial. In each
trial, we select an hypothesis space, choose one hypothesis from that space to be the
"correct" hypothesis (i.e., to be the unknown system), and then run each variation
of the empirical research model (the five variations of the training example selector
with each of the learning component biases and stopping criteria).
There are two sources of random variation in this experiment.First, when
the hypothesis space under study consists of arbitrary binary functions, they are
chosen at random (without replacement). Then one of the hypotheses from this
space was chosen as the unknown system. Hence, to obtain an overall estimate
of the experiment length required to learn with arbitrary binary hypotheses, it
is necessary to repeat these trials many times. We repeated the trials involving
randomly-chosen arbitrary binary functions 500 times for each configuration of
training example selector and stopping criterion. For 1-term DNF and 1-DL, there
is no random component to the choice of hypothesis space, so we only repeated
enough trials to allow each hypothesis in the space to be the unknown system
(unless 11-11 > 500, then we ran 500 repeated trials, each with a randomly picked
hypothesis as the unknown system).
The second source of random variation comes from the training example se-
lectors RANDOM, URANDOM, CRANDOM, and BRANDOM. Each of these selects
examples according to some probability distribution, and hence, the performance of
these example selectors in any particular trial can vary substantially. To overcome51
this problem, we perform 50 repeated trials of each of these example selectors
on each one of the hypothesis spaces chosen for study (the same hypothesis was
used for the unknown system for all repetitions). For example, each of the 500
randomly-chosen hypothesis spaces of arbitrary boolean functions is processed 50
times for each of these experiment selectors. In contrast,ORACLEis deterministic,
so it only needs to be executed once for each hypothesis space/unknown system
combination.
In addition to varying the hypothesis space and the example selector, we also
varied the number of inputs to the unknown system (n) and the number of out-
puts from the unknown system (m). Here is a summary of the independent and
dependent variables in this experiment.
The independent variables were:
The Training Example Selectors:
URANDOM, BRANDOM, CRANDOM(with k missing experiments, where 1 <
k <2n1),RANDOM, ORACLE.
Restricted Hypothesis Space Bias B : {0,1}n 1+{0,1}rn:
Randomly chosen from all binary functions
n = 3,m = 1 : IHI = 5,10,20,40,80,160,240;
n = 3, m = 2 := 80,160,320,640,1280,2560,5120;
n = 4, m = 1 : 11/I = 5,80,640,5120;
n = 4, m = 2 : IHI = 20,640,5120.
1 term DNF & randomly chosen matching sized spaces from the binary
functions
n = 3, m = 1 : IHI = 27;
n = 4, m = 1 : [Hi = 81;
n = 5,m = 1 : IHI = 243;
n = 6,m = 1 : = 729.52
1-DL & randomly chosen matching sized spaces from the binary func-
tions
n = 3,m = 1 : IHI = 97;
n = 4,m = 1 : 'HI = 1051;
n = 5,m = 1 : IHI = 15,037.
Stopping Criterion:
exact ((HI = 1),
GERR (6 = 0.10 and e = r").
There were two dependent variables. First, we measured the convergence speed
of the learning component by the experiment length (i.e., the average number of
experiments required to satisfy the stopping condition). Second, we measured the
robustness of each example selector as the standard deviation of the experiment
length.
Before presenting the results of this meta-experiment, we discuss the methods
employed to analyze these results.
4.4Methods Used for Analysis of the Results
The overall objective of this meta-experiment was to determine if active exper-
imentation was more effective than passive observation. We identified two major
problems a passive observer faces: needless repetition of some training examples
and a lack of other training examples. We analyze the data collected in this
meta-experiment to determine how varying these two factors affects the effective-
ness (performance, robustness, and computational cost) of experiment selection.
Needless repetitions should force the passive observer to collect many more train-
ing examples, while lack of examples should cause the observer to be unable to
differentiate among a number of competing hypotheses.
We look first at how the data was analyzed to determine the effect that training53
example repetition had. Then we discuss the analysis of the effect of missing
training examples.
4.4.1Analysis of Training Example Repetition
To compare relative performance of experiment selectors, we made eight plots,
each showing the performance of the selectors under different hypothesis space sizes
for a given hypothesis type. This allowed us to see how each selector performed
under different amounts of initial uncertainty (if the initial hypothesis space was
large, there was much more initial uncertainty than if the space was very small).
We also wanted to discover which of the independent variables had the most
effect on performance and how they interacted. This is important to understand-
ing how this work will scale to larger hypothesis spaces. We performed a two-level
factorial analysis [Box:78j of the performance data. This is where two "levels" (val-
ues) for each of k "factors" (independent variables) are chosen and data gathered
for all 2k possible combinations of levels. This kind of analysis can indicate major
trends and determine promising directions for further study. Two-level factorial
analysis has two main benefits: (1) it requires relatively few data points per inde-
pendent variable studied, and (2) it can show not only trends in the variables but
also interactions between variables (and is thus much more powerful than changing
a single variable at a time). The main drawback is that the levels chosen must be
such that the effect of that factor is strong enough to detect (e.g., if the factor is
"speed traveled" and you are looking for relativistic effects, then levels of 2 meters
per second and 4 meters per second would be useless). We go into detail about
two-level factorial analysis below when presenting the results.
Plotting the standard deviation shows how the robustness of the selectors com-
pare. This gives a measure of the reliability of the average as a measure of overall
performance (e.g., a selector with a performance3 of 5.5 ±0.5 might be preferable to
35.5 ± 0.5 means "an average of 5.5 experiments with a standard deviation of 0.5."54
a selector with performance of 5.1 ± 4.0). We make no claim that the performance
scores form a "normal" distribution, just that the square root of the variance is a
measure of how "reliable" the mean performance score is.
Computational cost is also an important factor to consider when judging the
effectiveness of a model.Formal analysis of each training example selector is
beyond the scope of this dissertation, instead we make several simple observations
about the relative costs to argue which methods may or may not be feasible.
4.4.2Analysis of Missing Training Examples
To determine the effect that missing input values had on the effectiveness of
empirical research, we compared the number of missing input valuesto the
proportion of unsolvable hypothesis spaces and the residual size of those unsolvable
spaces. We ran identical trials using CRA ND 0 M and removed from 1 to all but one
(2n 1) input values(the removed values were randomly selected). Two statistics
were measured: (a) the percentage of trials that were unlearnable and (b) the size
of those unlearnable hypothesis spaces. The first quantity tells us how often we can
expect a randomly chosen hypothesis space to be unlearnable for a given number
of missing input values x. The second quantity tells us what proportion of the
initial hypothesis space is indistinguishable if the space is unlearnable.
We now present an overview of the results, followed by details.
4.5Results
The single largest gain in overall effectiveness was through active control of
the unknown system's inputs. The results show (1) repetition of training examples
forces a passive researcher to collect many more examples than an active researcher
must collect before converging on the correct hypothesis and (2) a few missing
experiments kept the learning component from meeting its stopping criteria.
Specifically, for repeated input values we saw that:55
Simple active experimentation (RANDOM) was much closer in performance
to the ORACLE than it was to passive observation.Also, the larger the
hypothesis space, the better the active experimenter performed compared to
the passive observer.
The number of output values 2' and the size of the initial hypothesis space
IH1 were the two most important factors affecting performance. The num-
ber of input values 2" affected active experimentation only slightly, while it
affected passive observation much more.
Active experimentation was much more robust than passive observation. The
standard deviation of the RANDOM selector was often much closer to the
o R A CLE than to the passive observer (by orders of magnitude).
RANDOM is the lowest cost active experiment selector possible. Furthermore,
its performance and robustness were superior to the best passive observer
(u RANDOM).
For missing input values we saw that:
missing experiments had a small effect for an initial hypothesis space that
was a small fraction of the total possible hypothesis space; a large effect for
an hypothesis space that was a large fraction of the total possible hypothesis
space.
Even if an hypothesis space is unlearnable, often only a small number of
hypotheses (e.g., 2 or 3) are indistinguishable.
We look at these results in detail: the performance plots, the two-level factorial
analysis, the robustness plots, the computational cost analysis, and the missing
input value results.
The relative performance of all training example selectors did not change much
across the range of the independent variables. Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 show thatso
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Figure 7. Performance of the Training Example Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypothesis
Spaces with n = 3, m = 1.
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions ofBRANDOM, URANDOM,andRANDOMper
trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).
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Figure 8. Performance of the Training Example Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypothesis
Spaces with n = 3,m = 2.
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions ofBRANDOM, URANDOM,andRANDOMper
trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).60
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Figure 9. Performance of the Training Example Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypothesis
Spaces with n = 4, m = 1.
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions ofBRANDOM, URANDOM,andRANDOMper
trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).
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Figure 10. Performance of the Training Example Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypothesis
Spaces with n = 4, m = 2.
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions ofBRANDOM, URANDOM,andRANDOMper
trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).300
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Figure 11. Performance of the Training Example Selectors using 1-term DNF.
The hypothesis spaces consist of the set of 1-term DNF formulas with 3,4,5, or 6 variables
(II/) =27, 81, 243, and 729 respectively). Results are from 27, 81, 243, and 500 repeated trials
(for n = 3,4, 5, and 6 respectively), 50 repetitions ofBRANDOM, URANDOM,andRANDOMper
trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).
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Figure 12. Performance of the Training Example Selectors using Hypothesis Spaces Equivalent
in Size to 1-term DNF Spaces.
The hypothesis spaces are chosen at random from the set of binary functions with n = 3,4,5,6
equivalent in size to the 1-term DNF hypothesis spaces of Figure 11 (11-11 =27, 81, 243, and 729
respectively). Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions ofBRANDOM, URANDOM,and
RANDOMper trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual
value (p > 0.99).250 -
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Figure 13. Performance of the Training Example Selectors using 1-DL.
The hypothesis spaces consist of the set of 1-DL formulas with 3,4, or 5 variables (11-11= 97,
1050, and 15,036 respectively). Results are from 97, 500, and 500 repeated trials (for n=3,4,
and 5 respectively), 50 repetitions of BRANDOM, URANDOM, and RANDOM per trial (no
repetitions for ORACLE). Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).
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Figure 14. Performance of the Training Example Selectors using Hypothesis Spaces Equivalent
in Size to 1-DL Spaces.
The hypothesis spaces were chosen at random from the set of binary functions with n = 3,4,5
equivalent in size to the 1-DL hypothesis spaces of Figure 13 (IHI = 97, 1050, and 15,036
respectively). Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions of BRANDOM, URANDOM, and
RANDOM per trial (no repetitions for ORACLE). Values shown are within 2% of their actual
value (p > 0.99).60
Table 2. Effect that Restricted Hypothesis Space Bias had on the Performance.
Effect Estimate
RANDOM
± Standard
URANDOM
Error
BRANDOM
Overall Average Performance 4.41± 0.02 5.07± 0.04 5.52± 0.06
Effect of Changing
n from 4 to 5 0.01± 0.05-0.54± 0.07-1.12± 0.12
m from 2 to 1 2.58± 0.05 3.52± 0.07 4.19± 0.12
!HI from 5 to 80 2.78± 0.05 3.70± 0.07 4.27± 0.12
Interaction from
Simultaneously Changing
n & m -0.04± 0.05-0.33± 0.07-0.90± 0.12
n & IHI 0.07± 0.05-0.32± 0.07-0.68± 0.12
m & WI 0.88± 0.05 1.47± 0.07 2.00± 0.12
Interaction from
Simultaneously Changing
n & m & IHI 0.11± 0.05-0.24± 0.07-0.44± 0.12
Minimum Significance Level ±0.15 ±0.24 ±0.42
This shows the results of a two-level factorial analysis on the three factors n = 4, 5; m = 1,2;
and IHI = 5,80. Minimal significance level shows the minimum value an effect or interaction
must have to be significant (p > 0.995 using a weighted t distribution). Results are from 500
repeated trials, 50 repetitions per trial.
worst case active control (RANDOM) performs better than the best case observa-
tional method (URANDOM). The simple fact that environment-selected examples
can be repeated causes uR A ND om to perform worse than RANDOM (and BRANDOM
performed even worse). Figures 11, 12, 13, and 14 show this is even true for spe-
cialized underlying hypothesis spaces. In fact, these specialized subsets yield larger
differences between training example selectors than a randomly selected subset of
the binary functions.
We performed a two-level factorial analysis of the data for n = 3, 4; m = 1,2;
and WI = 5, 80. Examine Table 2 first.This table shows the estimated effect
that each level of each factor had on the overall average, along with the estimated
interactions of the factors.It shows the overall average for each selector and
estimates the effect of each individual factor or combination of factors. Note this
cannot be used to predict the average score for a given combination of factor levels,
only to estimate the effect each has on the overall performance. The estimates that
are larger in magnitude than the minimum significance level cannot be explained61
Table 3. Effect that Specialized Hypothesis Space Biases have on Performance
1-term Disjunctive Normal Form
Effect. Estimate
RANDOM
± Standard
URANDOM
Error
BRANDOM
Overall Average Performance 12.62± 0.1622.10± 0.7243.84 ± 3.49
Effect of Changing
H space type from random to 1-term DNF
(HI from 81 to 243
8.20
5.71
± 0.32
± 0.32
23.09
9.32
± 1.45
± 1.45
63.12 ± 6.98
30.98 ± 6.98
Interaction from
Simultaneously Changing
H space type and IHI 4.20± 0.328.62± 1.4531.37 ± 6.98
Minimum Significance Level ±1.49 ±6.67 ±32.14
1-Decision List
Effect Estimate
RANDOM
± Standard
URANDOM
Error
BRANDOM
Overall Average Performance 16.85 ± 0.0535.41± 0.4297.61 ± 3.30
Effect of Changing
H space type from random to 1-DL7.32 ± 0.1130.40± 0.83142.58 ± 6.60
IHI from 1051 to 25,037 8.53 ± 0.1115.66± 0.8368.01 ± 6.60
Interaction from
Simultaneously C hanging
H space type and lin 4.90 ± 0.1115.33± 0.8375.01 ± 6.60
Minimum Significance Level ±0.50 ±3.84 ±30.41
This shows the results of a two-fevel factorial analysis on the size of the hypothesis space IHI
and how the initial hypothesis space was se ected (from 1-DL or 1-term DNF verses all binary
functions). Minimal significance level shows the minimum value an effect or interaction must
have to be significant (p > 0.995 using a weighted t distribution). For 1-term DNF the results
are from 27, 81, 243, and 500 repeated trials (for= 27, 81, 243, and 729 respectively), 50
repetitions per trial. For 1-DL the results are from 97, 500, and 500 repeated trials (for IHI =
97, 1050, and 15,036 respectively), 50 repetitions per trial.
by noise, so they are real effects.In Table 2 we see that the overall average
performance for theRANDOMselector was 4.41 experiments and that the minimum
significance level was ±0.15 experiments. So, for example, n affected experiment
length by 0.01 experiments, so the effect of n was not significant (0.01 is smaller
than 0.15). m affected the experiment length by 2.58 experiments, so m was
significant. This is interpreted as meaning that changing the number of outputs in
from 2 to 1 had the effect of increasing the experiment length by 2.58 experiments.
From this we see that the number of inputs n has little effect on the performance
ofRANDOM,but the number of outputs m and hypothesis space size !HI have a
strong effect on the performance.There was also a small interaction between62
these two factors that allowed the number of outputs m to dominate (although for
another set of levels for IHI this might not be so). From this we can conclude that
the major effects appear to be the number of outputs m and the hypothesis space
size VII, with an interaction that improves the overall performance if m is larger.
For the passive observers(URANDOMandBRANDOM),we see a much different
picture. All factors had a significant effect, and all of them had significant inter-
actions. Both observers were more sensitive to all effects and interactions. It is
interesting to note that increasing the number of input experiments actually im-
proved performance. This is because of several additive factors: (a) for a constant
hypothesis space size, the number of relevant experiments increases as the number
of experiments increases (so the observer has more chance of seeing a relevant data
point), (b) the chance a given experiment will be repeated decreases as the number
of experiments increases. These factors combine to benefit the performance of the
passive observers, but this slight benefit is far outweighted by a major liability:
the hypothesis space is potentially much larger with an increase in the number of
possible experiments.
Table 3 shows how changing the "type" of hypothesis space affected the per-
formance. Again, we see thatRANDOMfar outperforms the passive observers, and
it is far less sensitive to specialized hypothesis spaces.
The robustness of the training example selector is measured by how consis-
tently each selector performed with changes in the size and makeup of the initial
hypothesis space. From Figures 15, 16, 17, and 18, we see that for randomly select-
ed subsets of binary functions, the hypothesis space size H has little effect on the
standard deviation forRANDOMandORACLE.However, increasing H causes the
standard deviation to increase forURANDOMandBRANDOM.For the 1-term DNF
and 1-DL spaces (Figures 19, 20, 21, and 22), we see that the standard deviations
forBRANDOMandURANDOMincrease much faster for larger spaces than for their
equivalent sized randomly selected spaces (in fact the standard deviation decreas-
es for these). Note the number of experiments 2" and the number of associatedao -
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Figure 15. Robustness of the Training Example Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypotheses
with n = 3, m = 1.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 7 above, with 25,000 trials for each data
point (500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).
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Figure 16. Robustness of the Training Example Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypotheses
with n = 3,m = 2.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 8 above, with 25,000 trials for each data
point (500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).
outcomes 2' have a strong effect on randomly selected hypothesis spaces.
Now that we have considered experiment length and robustness, let us turn
to the last of our three dependent variables: the computational cost of selecting80
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Figure 17. Robustness of the Training Example Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypotheses
with n = 4, rn = 1.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 9 above, with 25,000 trials for each data
point (500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).
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Figure 18. Robustness of the Training Example Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypotheses
with n = 4,m = 2.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 10 above ,with 25,000 trials for each
data point (500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).1000
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Figure 19. Robustness of the Training Example Selectors using 1-term DNF.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 11 above. There were 1,350, 4,050,
12,150, and 25,000 trials for each data point (for 1HI =27, 81, 243, and 729 respectively).
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Figure 20. Robustness of the Training Example Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypothesis
Spaces Equivalent in Size to 1-term DNF Spaces.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 12 above. There were 25,000 trials for
each data point (500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).E 240
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Figure 21.Robustness of the Training Example Selectors using 1-DL.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 13 above. There were 4,840, 25,000, and
25,000 trials for each data point (for !HI =97, 1050, and 15,036 respectively).
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Figure 22.Robustness of the Training Example Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypothesis
Spaces Equivalent in Size to 1-DL Spaces.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 14 above. There were 25,000 trials for
each data point (500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).67
experiments. Computational costs are very small for all of these experiment se-
lection methods (exceptingORACLE,of course). Since the environment selects the
examples forBRANDOM, URANDOM,andCRANDOM,there is no computational cost
to the experimenter for these selectors. The computational cost of implementing
RANDOMis very small, since all that is needed is to avoid performing the same
experiment twice. This can be accomplished by maintaining a search tree (e.g., a
B-tree) containing all experiments that have already been performed. Such a tree
can be searched in logarithmic time, so the time to perform k experiments is at
most 0 (k log k).
Finally, when looking atCRANDOM(Figure 23, 24, 25, and 26), we note how the
number of unsolvable hypothesis spaces remained low until a significant fraction
of the total number of input values were missing. With a small fraction of the
total binary space, a large fraction of the input values can be unavailable and the
learner is still able to eliminate a sizable portion of that initial hypothesis space
(e.g., in Figure 26, for (HI = 5 and half the experiment values missing, still all
of the hypothesis space is normally learnable). With a large fraction of the total
binary space, much of the hypothesis space is unlearnable if even one experiment
is missing (Figure 23).
Figures 27, 28, 29, and 30 show how large the unlearnable hypothesis spaces for
CRANDOMtend to be. In fact many of these spaces only had 2 or 3 hypotheses in
them (WI = 5 for all of the values for n and m). Only when a very large fraction
of the experiments were missing was a large fraction of the initial hypothesis space
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Figure 23. Proportion of Hypothesis Spaces that are CRANDOM Unlearnable with n =3, m =1.
Each bar represents 5000 trials.
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Figure 24.Proportion of Hypothesis Spaces that are CRANDOMUnlearnable with n = 3, m =2.
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Figure 25.Proportion of Hypothesis Spaces that areCRANDOMUnlearnable with n = 4, m = 1.
Each bar represents 5000 trials.
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Figure 26.Proportion of Hypothesis Spaces that areCRANDOMUnlearnable with n = 4, m = 2.
Each bar represents 5000 trials. Non of these 5000 hypotheses spaces were unlearnable until at
least seven input values were missing.5 10 20 40 80 160
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Figure 27. Proportion of Initial Hypothesis Space that is Residual when the Space isCRANDOM
Unlearnable with n = 3, m = 1.
Each bar represents 5000 trials.
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Figure 28. Proportion of Initial Hypothesis Space that is Residual when the Space isCRANDOM
Unlearnable with n = 3, m = 2.
Each bar represents 5000 trials.a
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4.6Conclusions
The meta-experiments in this chapter show that even simplistic active control
is more effective than passive observation. The active training example selector,
namedRANDOM ,is nearly as robust asORA CLEand much more robust than the
passive observers. The results also show that most of the gap between the "best
possible passive observer"(URANDOM)and theORACLEis bridged by the "worst
possible active experimenter"(RANDOM).Average performance ofRANDOMis
always closer to the performance ofORACLEthan toURA ND OM M.The single largest
gain in overall effectiveness was through active control of the unknown system's
inputs.
From the two-level factorial analysis, we see that the passive observers are much
more sensitive to all three factors than the active experimenter. (In fact the active
experimenter is often not sensitive to the number of inputs 2n, while the passive
observer is.) This implies that the active researcher will be more robust for larger
problems.
We now look at the effect careful selection of experiments can have over per-
formance of an active experimenter.73
Chapter 5
Meta Experiment 2: Effect of Experiment Bias
In the previous chapter we saw that having minimal control over the inputs
to an unknown system (RANDOM) gave a dramatic decrease in the number of
training examples needed to determine the correct theory from an initial set of
hypotheses. By comparing RANDOM to ORACLE, we also saw there was noticeable
room for improvement.Is it possible that a more intelligent selection strategy
might perform better?
In this chapter, we address this question by introducing an ideal or normative
experimenter that performs the experiment most likely to force the learning compo-
nent to converge as fast as possible. Such a ideal experimenter can be implemented
by performing an exhaustive search of all possible experiment sequences to find
the sequence whose expected length is the shortest (according to the theory bias
of the learning component). In other words, an ideal experimenter can compute
its experiment bias (i.e., its preferences for which experiment to perform next) by
analyzing its theory bias (i.e., its a priori restrictions and preferences concerning
which hypotheses are most likely to be correct).
Unfortunately, this ideal experimenter, which we have named EXHAUSTIVE, is
extremely expensive to execute, even for the very small problems we are studying.
Hence, we have introduced two other "clever" experiment selectors that are less
expensive and more realistic. We call them GREEDY and RELEVANT. The main74
goal of this chapter is to present a meta-experiment in which these two experiment
selectors (and also EXHAUSTIVE, when possible) are compared to RANDOM and
ORACLE as described in Chapter Four.
To carry out this comparison, we must first identify the important independent
variables to consider. As in Chapter Four, we vary the size of the hypothesis space
'HI, which controls the restricted hypothesis space bias. However, because the de-
tails of the preference bias are also important for these clever experiment selectors,
we must also consider ways in which the preference bias can be varied. We have i-
dentified three properties of the preference bias, and these are varied systematically
to evaluate the different experiment selectors under a range of conditions.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we define three experiment selec-
tors (EXHAUSTIVE, GREEDY, and RELEVANT). Then, we define and describe the
three properties of preference bias to be varied in the meta-experiment. Third, we
describe a meta-experiment in which EXHAUSTIVE and GREEDY are compared to
determine whether GREEDY is a good approximation to EXHAUSTIVE. We conclude
that GREEDY is a reasonable approximation, and this allows us to discard EXHAUS-
TIVE in our subsequent experiments. Finally, we describe the meta-experiment in
which GREEDY and RELEVANT are compared to RANDOM and ORACLE.
5.1Training Example Selection
As we stated in Chapter Two, currently held beliefs (hypotheses) should be able
to help guide experimentation. Thus, a training example selector which derived its
experiment bias from the theory bias should outperform RANDOM (which ignored
the theory bias).
Consider an active researcher investigating an unknown system. Assume at any
point in time the learning component represents its knowledge as a set of hypothe-
ses H, each being consistent with all information the researcher has seen thus far.
Each hypothesis hi E H is assigned an initial likelihood or prior probability P(hi).75
The experiment selector chooses an experiment x and performs it, obtaining the
training exampleif). The learning component is given this training example and
updates the hypothesis space and the probability associated with each hypothesis
hi using Bayes' Theorem:
P(hi) IP(hi)if hi(x) =
P(hil(i,g)) = where P((i,
E PO,
Mihi) =
o.00otherwise.
hiEH
This probability distribution over the hypotheses can be used to implement a
preference bias for the learning component (the more preferred the hypothesis, the
higher its associated probability).
We define a normative model for experiment selection, which we call EXHAUS-
TIVE, that uses this theory bias to compute its experiment bias. We define EX-
HAUSTIVE as always choosing the first experiment on the minimum length experi-
ment sequence, because our measure of performance is the number of experiments
performed by the experiment selector. We can find the experiment most likely
to be first on the optimal experiment sequence by investigating every experiment
sequence and weighting this sequence using the probability distribution over the
hypotheses. Unfortunately, any real implementation of EXHAUSTIVE is just as its
name implies. In general, it must consider all possible sequences of the 2" experi-
ments, or 2'1 experiment sequences (even in our domain, where experiment order
is unimportant, it must still consider the power set of r experiments, or 22n ex-
periment sequences). This can be prohibitively expensive for even small problems.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to approximate EXHAUSTIVE.
Hence, we introduce a different experiment selector which we call the infor-
mation theoretic experiment selector. Because each hypothesis hi E H is assigned
an initial likelihood or prior probability P(hi), the entropy of this distribution
Entropy(P) measures the lack of knowledge (or amount of uncertainty) of the
learning component. After an experiment is performed the probabilities associat-
ed with the hypotheses are updated. If the Entropy(P) of this new distribution76
has changed, then the reduction in entropy is the amount of new information the
experiment i yielded, also known as the "payoff." The information theoretic ex-
periment selector should choose the sequence of experiments that maximizes the
expected reduction in Entropy(P). This takes into account situations where an
experiment selector might have to initially perform very low payoff experiments
in anticipation of being in a position for extremely high payoffs, thus yielding the
maximum overall payoff. Unfortunately, this model of experiment selection is also
expensive to implement (in fact, more expensive than EXHAUSTIVE).
Fortunately, there is an easy approximation to the information theoretic ex-
periment selector, which we call GREEDY. GREEDY chooses the experiment most
likely to minimize the resulting entropy of the hypothesis space (so it is a one-step
look-ahead version of the information theoretic experiment selector). GREEDY is
much cheaper to execute than EXHAUSTIVE, but still is very costly. Hence, as a
low-cost alternative, we introduce a very low cost "clever" experiment selector.
The simplest of our experiment selectors introduced in this chapter we call
RELEVANT. At each point where an experiment is required, RELEVANT randomly
selects from the set of all relevant experiments. A relevant experiment is one
where every possible outcome of that experiment will eliminate at least one of
the current hypotheses from consideration. RELEVANT ignores the preference bias
(unlike EXHAUSTIVE and GREEDY), deriving its experiment bias from the restricted
hypothesis space bias only. We look at implementation details and examples of
each selector next.
Implementation Details for EXHAUSTIVE
EXHAUSTIVE performs a complete search to find the sequence of experiments
having the minimum expected length (Epl). It then performs the first experiment
on that sequence. In the case of a tie, one of the minimum length paths is selected77
Table 4. Examples of the different Experiment Selectors.
System Inputs
A B
Learning
h1
System's
h2 h3
Hypothesis
h4
Space
h5 h6
Expected
Entropy
Minimum Expected
Experiment Length
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1.546 2.60
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1.642 2.71
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1.546 2.60
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.585 3.60
Prob. Dist. 0.200.100.210.200.200.09
EXHAUSTIVE does an exhaustive depth first search for the experiment most likely on the solution
path. The minimum expected experiment sequences in the table above are computed as
shown in the text below. EXHAUSTIVE would choose either experiment 00 or 10.
GREEDY selects the single experiment that is most likely to reduce the entropy of the resulting
hypothesis space the most. The expected entropies in the table above are computed as
shown in the text below. GREEDY would randomly choose either experiment 00 or 10.
RELEVANT randomly choose without replacement from experiments {00, 01, 10}, ignoring ex-
periment 11 as irrelevant.
RANDOM randomly choose without replacement from experiments {00, 01, 10, 11}.
at random. The first experiment on the minimum length sequence is computed as
0.00 if 1H1 = 1, p, . 2ni E l (H X) =
1111ex EP(Cii, gi)1H) x Epl(H', X') +1 otherwise,
=1
where H is the initial hypothesis space and X is the set of all possible input values.
gi)IH) was previously defined, although each time H' is computed (as the
computation goes deeper into the recursion) the probabilities must be normalized
(the sum of the probabilities must equal 1.0) before computing this term.
(hk)
P(hki(ii,C
P
) =
hiEH
normalizes each hypothesis in H' (e.g., from Table 4, if Ir{h1 h3}, where
P(h1) = 0.20, and P(h3) = 0.21, then the "new" normalized probabilities would be
P(h1)
0.200+00
.2 = .21= 0.49 and P(h3)0.20 +0.21 = 0.51). The term H' is computed
as {hk E H : hk(gi) = gi}, and it is the "new" hypothesis space consisting only
of members of H that are consistent with the training examplegi). Finally,
the term X' is the set of experiments X with the experiment xi removed (e.g.,
{00 01 10 }).Initial invocation of Epl:
First recursive
invocation of Epl:
Second recursive
invocation of Epl:
0.51(0..1)-0.51
r-o
H-(h1 h2 ha h4 ha he)
P-(0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.00)
X-(00 01 10 11)
m n
H-(111 h2 h3 h4 ha ha)
P-(0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.09)
X-(00 01 10 11)
P(100,0) I H) - 0.61
h in H : h(00)-0 is (h1 h3 h4)
X - 00 - (01 10 11)
1-01
70(0.674.1) -717 167 sum
Y-13Z\
H(h1 h3 h4)
P-(0.33 0.34 0.33)
X-(01 10 11)
P((01,0) I H)0.67
h in H : h(01)-0 is (h1 h3)
X01 - (10 11)
m
x - 10 x.11
ib.sum4.--0.49(04.1)-0.49
y-0t \ y-1
H-(h1 h3)
P-(0.33 0.34)
X-(10 11)
P((10,0) IH) - 0.51
h h H : h(10)-0 is (h3)
X - 10 - (11)
E/14-2
I H - (h3)1
HI -1
ntn
0.theses x-10, Ep1-1.0
1.0(1.0+1)-2.0
-o 7-1
H-(h1 h3)
P-(0.33 0.34)
X-(10 11)
P1(10,1) 1 H) - 0.49
hh H: h(10)-1 is (h1)
X10 - (11)
H-(111 ha)
P-(0.33 0.34)
X-(10 11)
PO11,0)H) - 1.00
h In H : h(11)-0 Is (hi 113)
X - 11 - (10)
H-(h1 h3)
P-(0.33 0.34)
X-(10 11)
P((11,1) i H) - 0.00
h in H :1611)-1 Is ()
X11 - (10)
1
H(hi)
chaos* 1-10, I
Epl -1.0 min
4-10 sum-1.0
sum I0----0.49(2.1)-0.49
y-oZ\ y-1
0.51(0+1)-0.51
Prune his handl
beaus* h is empty.
H-(h1 h3)
P -(0.33 0.34)
X-(10)
P((10,0) 1 H)0.51
hH : h(10)-0 is (h3)
X10 - ( )
I H. (1'3)1 EP/-o
H-(111 h9)
P -(0.33 0.34)
X-(10 11)
P((10,1) 1 H) - 0.49
h in H : h(10)-1 Is (h1)
X10 - ( )
IH'')I EPI-O I HI-
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Figure 31. Partial Example of the Training Example Selector named EXHAUSTIVE.
A partial computation tree for EXHAUSTIVE (this is approximately 3% of the entire calling
tree). Dark lines and figures represent values descending the tree, grey lines and values are
ascending the tree. Probabilities associated with the hypotheses in H are listed in order for P
(e.g., H = (h1, h2) and P = (0.44,0.56) states that P(h1) = 0.44 and that P(h2) = 0.56).
Using Table 4 we will trace the first several steps of the computation forEX-
HAUSTIVE(see Figure 31).Epl is initially invoked with the hypothesis space
H = (h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6), with probabilities P = (0.20, 0.10, 0.21, 0.20, 0.20,
0.09) respectively and with the set of possible experiments X = (00, 01, 10, 11).79
At the first recursive invocation of Epl, we start by normalizing the probabilities
for the hypothesis set (which is actually unnecessary for the first invocation). The
hypothesis set {h E H : h(00) = 0} is the set of hypotheses H' = (h1, h3, h4). Then
we compute P((00,0)1H) = 0.20+0.21+0.20 = 0.61 (for hypotheses h1, h3, and h4
respectively). The new experiment set X' = {X00} consists of experiments 01,
10, and 11. At the second recursive invocation of Epl the first step is to normalize
the probabilities for the hypotheses h1, h3, and h4. P(h1) = 0.204.°0:r1+0.20-0.33;
likewise, P(h3) = 0.34 and P(h4)= 0.33. The computation proceeds as before
from this point.
When the computation reaches a point where IHI = 1 (the base of the recur-
sion), the values for Epl begin flowing back up the computation tree (these are
shown in grey on Figure 31). The estimated length of the experiment sequence
beginning with experiment 00 is finally computed to be 2.60 (and to be 2.71, 2.60,
and 3.60 for experiments 01, 10, and 11 respectively). Hence, EXHAUSTIVE will
randomly choose either experiment 00 or experiment 10 (because both have the
same minimum expected experiment sequence length).
Implementation Details for GREEDY
GREEDY chooses the experiment most likely to minimize the entropy of the
resulting hypotheses space.In the case of a tie, one of the minimum entropy
experiments is selected at random. Let 2"1 be the number of possible outcomes.
Then GREEDY chooses the x, with the minimum expected entropy where
2"1
ExpectedEntropy(Hili) = E x Entropy(Hi(ii,M)
j=1
The P(Cii, -CIH) term is the aggregate probability, according to all the hy-
potheses in H, thatis the result of performing experiment 4. This can be
computed as
P((ii,M1H) =E Poo,
{hkEH:hk(Z)=Z}80
where hk(4) = gi is true if the training example (4, gi) is predicted by hk.
The term Entropy(HRZ,M)) denotes the entropy of the remaining space of
hypotheses after performing an experimentand getting a result This is
computed as
Entropy(HRii,c) E p(hki(-4,4)) x log2 P(hk KZ, gi))
hkEH
E P(hkiCiis.0) x log2P(hki(ii,C).
hk EH
Finally, the probability associated with a hypothesis given that a training ex-
ample is correct, P(hkl(ii, Z)), can be computed by Bayes' Rule as described in
the previous section.
For example, in Table 4 we have the four experiments (00,01,10,11), so we need
to compute the expected entropy for each of these. Consider the 00 experiment as
an example. First we need to compute the probability, according to H, that the
result of the 00 experiment is 0 or 1. This is simply the sum of the prior probabilities
of all hypotheses that predict each outcome. For example, the probability that 00
will result in 0 is
moo, o)1H) E P(hk)
{hkEH:hk(00).0}
= 0.20 + 0.21 + 0.20
= 0.61.
This is because hypotheses h1, h3, and h4 predict a 0 for a 00 experiment (and
their prior probabilities are 0.20, 0.21, and 0.20 respectively). Similarly,
p((00,1)1H) E P(hk)
fh,EH:h,(00).11
odo + 0.20 + 0.09
= 0.39.
Next, we need to consider the updated hypothesis spaces that the learning com-
ponent would compute for each of the two outcomes of the 00 experiment. If the81
outcome is 0, for example, then hypotheses h2, h5, and h6 will be eliminated from
H, and the probabilities of the remaining hypotheses will be updated according
to Bayes' Rule. If the outcome is 1, then h1, h3, and h4 will be eliminated. We
compute the entropy of each of these updated hypothesis spaces:
Entropy(HI(00, 0))-E (P(hk1(00,0))log2P(hki(00,0)))
hk EH
= E (P(hk1(00,0))log2 P(hki(00,0)))
fhih3h41
(0.20 0.200.21 0.210.20 0.20)
a aa6aa a
= 1.585
where a = 0.20 + 0.21 + 0.20, because h1, h3, h4 predict a 0 result for the 00 exper-
iment, and P(h1) = 0.20, P(h3) = 0.21 and P(h4) = 0.20. Thus P(hi 1(00,0)) =
0.20 and likewise for h3 and h4. Similarly, 0.20+0.21+0.20
Entropy(HI(00,1)) > (P(hk1(00,1)) log2 P(hk1(00,1)))
hkEH
= E (P(hkl(00,1))1og2 P(141(00,1)))
{h2hshe}
0.100.20,0.200.09
log2
0.09 (log2 log2 log2 - 00)313130
. 1.486
(where fl = 0.10+0.20+0.09) because h2, h5, and h6 predict a 1 for the experiment
00 and P(h2) = 0.10, P(h5) = 0.20, and P(h6) = 0.09.
Now, to obtain the expected entropy remaining after performing experiment 00,
we weight these two entropy values according to the probability that each outcome
will be observed: The expected entropy after performing the 00 experiment is
ExpectedEntropy(00) = P((00,0)IH) x Entropy(H1(00, 0))
+P((00, 1)IH) x Entropy(111(00, 1))
= 0.61 x 1.585 + 0.39 x 1.486
= 1.546.82
By the same procedure, the expected remaining entropy for experiments 01,
10, and 11 is computed yielding the values 1.642, 1.546, and 2.585 respectively.
Hence,GREEDYwill randomly choose either experiment 00 or 10, because either
gives the smallest expected remaining entropy (or equivalently, the largest expected
reduction in uncertainty).
Implementation Details forRELEVANT
Compared toEXHAUSTIVEandGREEDY, RELEVANThas a very simple experi-
ment bias. It randomly selects any of the relevant experiments 4. For x, to be rele-
vant there must exist at least two hypotheses hi,hk E H such that h;(4)
For example, Table 4 shows a hypothesis space of six hypotheses; each one
is a two input, one output binary function. There are four possible experiments
(00,01,10,11) corresponding to A=0 & B=0, A=0 & B=1, A=1 & B=0, and A=1
& B=1. Of these, all but the last experiment are relevant because each of the first
three experiments will eliminate at least one hypothesis from the space. Thus,
RELEVANTwill randomly pick either experiment 00, 01, or 10. Performing the 11
experiment can never eliminate any hypotheses because all of the hypotheses agree
on the outcome of experiment 11.
This completes our description of the three "clever" experiment selectors that
derive an experiment bias from the learning component's theory bias. Two selectors
use the preference bias, while one uses only the restricted hypothesis space bias. By
comparing these toRANDOMandORACLE,we can investigate how these intelligent
strategies affect performance. Next we look at the learning component, which is
used to investigate the robustness of the above selectors.
5.2Learning Component
To investigate the robustness of these training example selectors, we hold the
experiment selectors constant while varying the learning component. Due to com-83
putational limitations, we only vary the theory bias in this meta-experiment.
5.2.1Theory Bias
The theory bias encodes the current beliefs of the learning system, describing
which hypotheses are closest to modeling the unknown system. There are two
forms of theory bias employed by our learning component: restricted hypothesis
space bias and preference bias.
Restricted Hypothesis Space Bias
Restricted hypothesis space bias limits the possible hypotheses that the learn-
ing component can consider. It says nothing about which are most (or least) likely
to be correct, just what is possible. This is implemented directly by presenting
the learning component an enumerated list of hypothesesall hypotheses on the
list must be considered and all others must be ignored. RELEVANT, aspresented
above, derives its experiment bias from this theory bias by preferring experiments
that must eliminate at least one hypothesis from the learning component's consid-
eration (where at least two hypotheses predict different outcomes for this relevant
experiment).
Preference Bias
Preference bias is much more complex to define. It places an ordering on the
hypotheses of the learning system, informing that system which ones are most
(and least) likely to be correct. This is often used by a learning system to fo-
cus its attention on a subset of the possible hypotheses. In our learning system
we implement it as a probability distribution over the current hypotheses. Both
EXHAUSTIVE and GREEDY derive their experiment bias from preference bias. To
study how robust these selectors are, we define three parameters of preference bias
and investigate how varying these alters the experiment bias.84
Table 5. Example of Calculating the Preference Bias in a Simple Hypothesis Space.
h1 h2 h3
Hypothesis Space (0 0 11)(0 1 01)(0 0 10)(1 1 01)"
Unknown System E = h3
Hamming Distances 1 3 0 46
Correctness = 0.66
Ordering (forward) 1 3 2 4
Final Preference Bias 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.22
Strength = 0.003
'This hypothesis space has four hypotheses in it. Each place in the list represents a two digit
binary number from 0 (00) to 3 (11). The first hypothesis, h1, states that (00,0) (experiment
00 results in a 0), (01,0), (10,1) and (11,1).
61-4, "(0 0 1 1)", agrees with the target theory in all but 1 experiment, number 00 (experiment
00 results in a 0 for hypothesis 1 and a 0 for the correct theory).
Whenever a preference ordering is imposed over a group of items, there are
three factors that must be considered: (a) how the ordering itself is established,
(b) the correctness of the ordering, and (c) the strength of the preference. These
cannot be measured by the learning system itself, because they require knowing
which hypothesis is correct before the learning occurs.However, these metrics
do allow us (the meta-experimenters) to measure the robustness of an experiment
bias. We describe these three factors next (Table 5 will be used to illustrate),
which we name ordering, correctness, and strength.
The ordering, or the "order of preference" for a group of hypotheses. We
chose to order hypotheses according to their similarity to the unknown sys-
tem E using Hamming distance (HD). The Hamming distance between two
hypotheses, if there are 2' experiments possible, is
2n 1if x is true,
HD(hi,hi) = E True(hi(ii)h,(4)), where True(x) =
0if x is false.
We investigate three possible methods of assigning an order based on the
Hamming distance: forward, random, and reverse.
Forward ordering places the smallest Hamming distances first in the
ordering and the largest distance last. This gives a preference for hy-85
potheses that are similar to the correct theory. If hi is before hj in the
ordering, then HD(hi,E) < HD(hi,E).
Random ordering ignores Hamming distance and randomly assigns the
ordering. It is used as a controlrandom ordering should yield the same
result as no preference bias at all.
Reverse ordering places the largest Hamming distances first in the or-
dering and the smallest last in the ordering. This gives a preference for
hypotheses most different from the correct theory. If hi is before h; in
the ordering, then HD(hi, E) > HD(h;, E).
For example, in Table 5, if h3 is the correct hypothesis, then the Ham-
ming distances are HD(hi, h3) = 1, HD(h2, h3) = 3, HD(h3, h3) = 0 and
HD(h4, h3) = 4. This gives a forward ordering of h3, h1, h2, h4 (where h3 is
first, and h4 is last).
The correctness of the ordering reflects where the correct theory falls in the
ordering.It can be expressed as a fraction (where 1.00 means the correct
hypothesis is first in the ordering and 0.00 means it is last). So if E = hi is
the correct theory and the ordering of H is hlhn, then
Correctness(H, E)
(ni)
(n 1)*
For example, if the correct hypothesis h3 is second in the ordering (h1, h3,
h2, h4) of the hypothesis space in Table 5, then
4
Correctness(4, 2)
1
2)
)
The strength determines how great the differences in preference are: the
stronger the bias, the greater the difference in probability between adjacent
hypotheses in the ordering. We base our measure of strength on the entropy
of the probability distribution. A strength of 0.00 means that the entropy of86
the probability distribution is maximized (so all probabilities are equalthe
same as no preference bias at all). A strength of 1.00 means that the most
preferred hypothesis has probability 1.00 and all others have probability 0.00
(minimum entropy of the probability distribution).
1 P(hi) log2 POO
log2 IHI
1 +
Ei P(hi) log2 P(hi)
loge IHI
For example, if we assign the probabilities P(hl) = 0.28, P(h3) = 0.26, P(h2) =
0.24, and P(h4) = 0.22 to the hypothesis space in Table 5 then
Strength(H) =1 +
0.28 log2 0.28 + 0.26 log2 0.26 + 0.24 log2 0.24 + 0.22 log2 0.22
log2 4
Strength(P) =
= 0.003.
In summary, our preference bias imposes an ordering across the hypothesis
space by assigning probabilities to the hypotheses: the more likely that the hy-
pothesis is the correct one, the higher the probability assigned to it. The entropy
of this probability distribution is inversely related to the strength of the bias. The
position of the correct hypothesis in this ordering defines the correctness of the
preference bias.
Training Example Selector and Learning Component Summary
This concludes the description of the training example selectors and the learning
component. First, we defined a normative experiment bias model, described several
experiment selectors, and showed how the selectors could derive their experiment
bias from the learning component theory bias. Second, we detailed two types of
theory bias: preference bias and restricted hypothesis space bias. For preference
bias, we defined three factorsordering, correctness, and strengththat will allow
us to investigate how preference bias affects the performance. Next we present the
two parts of this meta-experiment: the first part compares the two selectors derived
from preference bias, while the second is a study similar to Chapter Four.87
5.3Meta-Experiment 2.1: Experiment Bias from Prefer-
ence Bias
A major problem with EXHAUSTIVE is its computational cost. If the unknown
function has n inputs and m outputs (or 2" input values and 2"' output values),
then EXHAUSTIVE may inspect all 0(2n+m) training examples (which, at worst,
might require EXHAUSTIVE to inspect all orderings of these training examples, or
about 2n+m! experiment sequences). If GREEDY 13 a good approximation to EX-
HAUSTIVE, we can do more extensive investigation using GREEDY as a replacement
for EXHAUSTIVE.
Hence, this meta-experiment investigates two questions: (1) what are the effects
of different preference biases on GREEDY and EXHAUSTIVE; and (2) is GREEDY a
good approximation to EXHAUSTIVE?
5.3.1Methodology
Initial investigation of the independent variables showed that the following
were characteristic values that meet the criteria for a 2-level factorial experiment
[Box:78]. The learning component stopping criteria was to find exactly the correct
hypothesis.
The independent variables (and their values) were:
Experiment Selector: EXHAUSTIVE, GREEDY.
Preference Bias Ordering: forward, reverse.
Preference Bias Correctness: 0.20, 0.80.
Preference Bias Strength: 0.00, 0.50.
Restricted Hypothesis Space Bias:
Randomly choose spaces of size IHI = 60 and 200 from all binary functions
of three variables (n = 3, m = 1).88
This gives a total of 25 = 32 combinations of independent variables. We ran 30
trials of GREEDY with these combinations. Because of the computational cost,
we ran EXHAUSTIVE for only 15 trials with 11/1 = 60 and for only 10 trials with
= 200 for each combination of the preference bias parameters.
The dependent variable was the number of experiments required to satisfy the
learning system stopping criterion. We compared the two experiment selectors on
how they performed, how robust they were, and their computational cost.
5.3.2Results
Preference bias had little or no effect on the performance of EXHAUSTIVE and
GREEDY. GREEDY was a fairly good approximation to EXHAUSTIVE in perfor-
mance.
For GREEDY (Table 6) there were only 2 significant effects (p > 0.995) out of the
= 16 combinations of variables: hypothesis space size and an interaction between
the strength and the ordering of the preference bias. Hypothesis space size had
the overwhelming effect-5 to 10 times the interaction. Changing hypothesis space
size IHI from 60 to 200 increased the expected experiment length by 1.40 ± 0.04 (a
21% change). The interaction between strength and ordering of the preference bias
was that when the strength was 0.00 (all probabilities were equal), the direction
had no effect; whereas when the strength was 0.50, the direction had an effect.
This effect was expected, because when the strength is 0.00, there is no ordering
provided by the preference bias. However, the effect was smaller than expected
setting strength to 0.50 reduced the expected average experiment length by only
0.15 ± 0.04, or 2%.
For EXHAUSTIVE, we see a much different picture (Table 6). The only significant
effect was hypothesis space size. EXHAUSTIVE is immune to preference bias and
was only affected by restricted hypothesis space bias.
To determine how robust GREEDY was, we made several trials using different
values for the preference bias factors (we did not do this with EXHAUSTIVE, be-89
Table 6. Effects that changing Theory Bias Factors has on Performance of EXHAUSTIVE and
GREEDY.
Effect Estimate ± Standard
EXHAUSTIVE
Error
GREEDY
Overall Average Performance 6.63± 0.05 6.61± 0.02
Effect of Changing
Ordering from forward to reverse -0.25± 0.09-0.17± 0.05
Correctness from 0.80 to 0.20 0.01± 0.09 0.00± 0.05
Strength from 0.50 to 1.00 -0.05± 0.09-0.03± 0.05
IHI from 200 to 60 1.58± 0.09 1.43± 0.05
Interaction when Simultaneously Changing
Ordering & Correctness -0.02± 0.09 0.00± 0.05
Ordering & Strength -0.24± 0.09-0.17± 0.05
Correctness & Strength 0.01± 0.09 0.00± 0.05
Ordering & IHI 0.02± 0.09 0.17± 0.05
Correctness & IHI 0.01± 0.09 0.00± 0.05
Strength & IHI -0.12± 0.09 0.03± 0.05
Interaction when Simultaneously Changing
Ordering & Correctness & Strength -0.02± 0.09 0.00± 0.05
Ordering & Correctness & IH I -0.02± 0.09 0.00± 0.05
Ordering & Strength & IHI 0.02± 0.09 0.00± 0.05
Correctness & Strength & IHI 0.01± 0.09 0.00± 0.05
Interaction when Simultaneously Changing
Ordering & Correctness & Strength & IHI -0.02± 0.090.00± 0.05
Significance Level ±0.27 ±0.13
This shows the results of a 2-level factorial analysis on ordering, correctness, strength, and
hypothesis space size. Minimal significance level shows the minimum value for the result to be
significant (p > 0.995 using a weighted t distribution). Results for EXHAUSTIVE are from 15 or
10 trials (for IHI = 60 and 200 respectively), GREEDY results are from 30 trails.
cause, from the 2-level factorial experiment, none of these variables had any effect).
Details of performance when varying preference bias factors for a fixed hypothesis
space size are shown in Figure 32. Notice that the effect of a very small preference
is felt, but increasing that preference has little or no further effect. Correctness
had no effect; further investigation found it was only effective if exactly 1.00 or
exactly 0.00 (i.e., the correct hypothesis was either the first or last hypothesis in
the ordering).
We conclude that (1) preference bias has very little effect on the performance or
robustness of EXHAUSTIVE and GREEDY and (2) GREEDY performs slightly worse
than EXHAUSTIVE, but it is still a good approximation. Deriving the experiment
bias from the preference bias is quite costly to implement and has very little effect6.4
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Figure 32. How Preference Bias Affects the Performance of GREEDY.
This shows how the ordering and strength of the learning components preference bias affect the
performance of GREEDY. The correctness was held at 0.80, and the restricted hypothesis space
bias was held constant at 'Hi = 60. Each data point is the average of 100 non-repeated trials.
on the two experiment selectors we testedit was not worth the trouble.
One way to reduce the computational cost of GREEDY is by setting the strength
of the preference bias to 0.00, so that all hypotheses are equally likely (the overall
average behavior when this is done would not change according to Figure 32).
Note that we did not eliminate the preference bias, just set to to a strength of
0.00, where Vi, j P(hi) = P (hi).Thus, the learning component will have no
preference for one hypothesis over another, but the probability distribution is still
used by the training example selector to choose the next experiment to perform.
With this modification we were able to implement GREEDY very efficiently.
This allowed us to gather significant groups of data (so we could make a stronger
statistical argument about our results).
We decided to compare GREEDY tO RELEVANT, RANDOM, and ORACLE next.91
5.4Meta-Experiment 2.2: Comparative Study of Train-
ing Example Selection Methods
We now compare the performance ofGREEDY(using an initial preference bias
of strength 0.00) toRELEVANT(and toRANDOMand oRA cLE).The goal of this
comparison is to determine which of the experiment biases is most effective and to
measure these "clever" biases againstORACLEandRANDOM(the best and worst
limits respectively).
5.4.1Methodology
The organization of this meta-experiment is identical to the organization of the
meta-experiment in Chapter Four (Section 4.3). Specifically, for several combina-
tions of hypothesis space bias and stopping criterion, we estimated the expected
experiment length of each of the four experiment selectors under consideration
(RANDOM, RELEVANT, GREEDY,and oRA CLE).To obtain accurate estimates, we
needed to overcome two sources of randomness. First, to overcome the random-
ness inherent inRANDOM, RELEVANT,andGREEDY,it was necessary to perform 50
repetitions (a repeated trial) for each hypothesis space chosen (the same hypothesis
was used for the unknown system for all 50 repetitions). Second, for the restricted
hypothesis space bias where IHI = k and k hypotheses are drawn at random (with-
out replacement) from the space of all possible binary functions, we performed 500
repetitions for each value of k, each with a different randomly chosen hypothesis as
the unknown system. This overcomes the randomness introduced when hypothesis
spaces and unknown system are drawn at random.
In all cases, the preference bias strength was 0.00 (maximum entropy, so there
is no preference for any hypothesis over another).
The independent variables are:
Training Example Selector:
RANDOM, RELEVANT, GREEDY, ORACLE.92
Restricted Hypothesis Space Bias B : {0,1}" 1 {0,1}m:
Randomly Chosen from All binary Functions
n = 3,m = 1 : IHI = 5,10,20,40,80,160,240;
n = 3,m = 2 : IHI = 80,160,320,640,1280,2560,5120;
n = 4,m = 1 : IHI = 5,80,640,5120;
n = 4,m = 2 : IHI = 20,640,5120.
1 term DNF & Randomly Chosen Matching Sized from All binary Func-
tions
n = 3, m = 1 : 1H1 = 27;
n = 4, m = 1 : IHI = 81;
n= 5,m = 1 : j1/1 = 243;
n = 6,m = 1 : IHI = 729.
1 DL & Randomly Chosen Matching Sized from All binary Functions
n = 3, m = 1 : IHI = 97;
n = 4, m = 1 := 1051;
n = 5,m = 1 : IHI = 15,037.
The Learning System Stopping Criteria:
exact (IHI = 1).
As before, there were two dependent variables. First, we measured the conver-
gence speed of the learning component by the experiment length (i.e., the average
number of experiments required to satisfy the stopping condition). Second, we
measured the robustness of each example selector as the standard deviation of the
experiment length.
We look at how these training example selectors compare on performance,
robustness, and computational cost next.93
Methods Used for Analysis of the Results
The purpose of this meta-experiment was to discover an effective training ex-
ample selection criterion. Several methods were used to analyze the performance
data in an attempt to address this goal: (a) comparing graphically the relative per-
formance of each selector for a given hypothesis space type, (b) comparing, on a
per-trial basis, the proportion of repeated trials that fell into a given classification,
(c) comparing the results of a 2-level factorial analysis to determine the effect each
independent variable had on the results, (d) comparing graphically the standard
deviations of each selector for a given hypothesis space type, and (e) an informal
computational cost analysis of each selector. With the exception of (b)a per-
trial comparison of performanceall of these analysis methods were employed in
Chapter Four.
The purpose of per-trial analysis is to answer the question: how often does
experiment selector a outperform experiment selector # on a randomly-drawn hy-
pothesis space/unknown system combination?If we consider only the average
number experiments required by a (call this a) and by(call this 0), we may be
misled. This is because it is possible for /3 to outperform a most of the time and
still have a < $ because of a few extraordinarily good cases in which a was much
better than Q. Hence, to determine the relative performance of each selector we
compared them on a per-trial bases. For each of the 500 repeated trials within a hy-
pothesis space size and type, we recorded how many timesGREEDYoutperformed
RELEVANTandRANDOM,how many timesRELEVANToutperformedGREEDYand
RANDOM,and so on. With these counts, we can obtain a more accurate picture of
the relative performance of the various experiment selectors.
5.4.2Results
The most effective experiment selection criterion was to select relevant experi-
ments, deriving experiment bias from the restricted hypothesis space bias. Prefer-94
ence bias did helpGREEDYto outperformRELEVANTandRANDOM,but this was
a very small improvement for a much larger computation cost. At no time did
any of the experiment selectors approach the performance ofORACLE,implying
that self-selected training examples are not as effective as tutor-selected training
examples.
Specifically, we saw that:
GREEDYwas only slightly better thanRELEVANTand only for small hypoth-
esis space sizes. As the space size approached the maximum of [2m]2n, the
difference disappeared and bothGREEDYandRELEVANTperformed equally
well.
A 2-level factorial experiment suggested that the number of experiments
available had no real effect on the performance ofGREEDYandRELEVANT.
Only the number of experimental outcomes and the hypothesis space size
affect performance: the larger the space size, the worse the performance; the
larger the number of outcomes, the better the performance.G REEDYwas
more sensitive to the number of experimental outcomes, whileRELEVANT
was more sensitive to the hypothesis space size.
Using the results from the 2-level factorial experiment, we modeled the per-
formance ofGREEDYandRELEVANTusing the number of experimental out-
comes 2' and the hypothesis space size IHI. This resulted in a very good
fit(R2> 0.99) using the formulaC1 + C2log2. IHi as a predictor for perfor-
mance (whereC1andC2were both less than 1.00).
A per-trial comparison of performance shows that for two experimental out-
comes (m = 1),RELEVANT13 a very good approximation toGREEDY,but
the difference between the two methods increases as the number of outcomes
increases. Still, even at its worstRELEVANTis an acceptable approximation
toGREEDY.8
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Figure 33. Performance of the Experiment Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypothesis Spaces
with n = 3, m = 1,
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions of RANDOM, RELEVANT, and GREEDY per
trial (no repetitions for ORACLE). Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).
For 1111 = 5 through 80 the difference between GREEDY and RELEVANT was less than 6%
(p > 0.99), while for )H) = 160 and 240 there was no difference (p > 0.99).
Comparing the standard deviations shows that GREEDY is very robust (close
tO ORACLE) while RELEVANT is half way between ORACLE and RANDOM in
robustness.
On the basis of computational cost, RELEVANT Wins hands down. GREEDY
requires fully enumerating the initial hypothesis space, while RELEVANT only
requires that a small number of hypotheses be enumerated.
We look at each of these results in detail now. From Figures 33, 34, 35, 36, 37,
38, 39, and 40 one can see that GREEDY and RELEVANT are very close in perfor-
mance for two-output experiments. As the number of experimental outcomes 2'
increases, RELEVANT moves toward the RANDOM, while GREEDY slightly improves.
Thus GREEDY is slightly better than RELEVANT, although both performed closer
to RANDOM than to ORACLE.
A 2-level factorial analysis Of GREEDY and RELEVANT using n = 2, 3; m = 1,2;
and 11/1 = 5, 60 shows interesting results (Tables 7 and 8).For GREEDY, only2000 3000
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Figure 34. Performance of the Experiment Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypothesis Spaces
with n = 3, m = 2.
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions ofRANDOM, RELEVANT,andGREEDYper
trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).
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Figure 35. Performance of the Experiment Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypothesis Spaces
with n = m = 1.
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions ofRANDOM, RELEVANT,andGREEDYper
trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
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Figure 36.Performance of the Experiment Selectors using Randomly Selected Hypothesis Spaces
with n = 4, m = 2.
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions ofRANDOM, RELEVANT,andGREEDYper
trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).
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Figure 37.Performance of the Experiment Selectors using 1-term DNF.
The hypothesis spaces are chosen randomly from the set of 1-term DNF formulas with 3, 4, 5,
or 6 variables (IHI =27, 81, 243, and 729 respectively). Results are from 27, 81, 243, and 500
repeated trials (for WI = 27, 81, 243, and 729 respectively), 50 repetitions ofRANDOM,
RELEVANT,andGREEDYper trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of
their actual value (p > 0.99).12"
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Figure 38. Performance of the Experiment Selectors using Hypothesis Spaces Equivalent in Size
to the 1-term DNF Spaces.
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions ofRANDOM, RELEVANT,andGREEDYper
trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Each hypothesis space is chosen at random from the set of
binary functions with n = 3,4,5,6 equivalent in size to the 1-term DNF hypothesis spaces of
Figure 37 OM =27, 81, 243, and 729 respectively). Values shown are within 2% of their actual
value (p > 0.99).
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Figure 39. Performance of the Experiment Selectors using 1-DL.
The hypothesis space consists of the 1-DL functions with 3, 4, or 5 variables (WI = 97, 1050,
and 15,036 respectively). Results are from 97, 500, and 500 repeated trials (for !HI = 97, 1050,
and 15,036 respectively), 50 repetitions ofRANDOM, RELEVANT,andGREEDYper trial (no
repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).30 -
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Figure 40. Performance of the Experiment Selectors using Hypothesis Spaces Equivalent in Size
to 1-DL Spaces.
Results are from500repeated trials,50repetitions of RANDOM, RELEVANT, and GREEDY per
trial (no repetitions for ORACLE). Each hypothesis space is chosen at random from the set of
binary functions withn = 3,4,5equivalent in size to the 1-DL hypothesis spaces of Figure39
(IHI= 97, 1050,and15,036respectively). Values shown are within 2% of their actual value
> 0.99).
the number of experimental results and the hypothesis space size had any effect,
and they interacted. Changing IHI from 5 to 60 increased the expected average
experiment length by 2.77. Changing the number of experimental outcomes from 2
to 4 decreased the expected average experiment length by 2.00. When both factors
were changed, they interacted, resulting in an expected experiment length increase
of 0.99 (as opposed to 0.837 if there had been no interaction).
For RELEVANT, the results were similar. The only difference was that changing
the hypothesis space size had a larger effect (2.86 experiments), and changing the
number of experimental results had a smaller effect (1.79 experiments). Also the
interaction between these two factors was smaller (0.96 experiments).
From the above, we should be able to model GREEDY and RELEVANT in terms of
the number of outputs m and the size of the hypothesis space IHI. Simply plotting
log2.11/1 against the average experiment length gave a very good fit (see Figure
41 and 42) of the form C1 + C2 log2. M. The difference between C2 for GREEDY100
Table 7. Effect of Restricted Hypothesis Space Bias on the Performance of the Experiment
Selectors.
Effect
ORACLE
Estimate ± Standard
GREEDY
Error
RELEVANT RANDOM
Overall Average Performance 2.24± 0.01 3.55± 0.01 3.82± 0.01 4.42± 0.02
Effect of Changing
n from 4 to 5 -0.19± 0.01-0.02± 0.02 0.04± 0.02 0.01± 0.05
m from 2 to 1 1.06± 0.01 2.00± 0.02 1.79± 0.02 2.58± 0.05
IHI from 5 to 80 1.95± 0.01 2.77± 0.02 2.86± 0.02 2.78± 0.05
Interaction when
Simultaneously Changing
n and in 0.01± 0.01 0.04± 0.02-0.01± 0.02-0.04± 0.05
n and IHI -0.07± 0.01 0.01± 0.02-0.01± 0.020.07± 0.05
in and IHI 0.55± 0.01 0.99± 0.02 0.96± 0.02 0.88± 0.05
Interaction when
Simultaneously Changing
n & in & )HI 0.11± 0.01 0.03± 0.02 0.05± 0.02 0.11± 0.05
Significance Level ±0.04 ±0.05 ±0.08 0.15
This shows the results of a 2-level factorial analysis on the three factors n = 4, 5; m = 1,2; and
11/1 = 5,80. Minimal significance level shows the minimum value an effect or interaction must
have to be significant (p > 0.995 using a weighted t distribution). Results are from 500 repeated
trials, 50 repetitions per trial.
and RELEVANT is not statistically significant. This can be interpreted as stating
that GREEDY and RELEVANT require slightly fewer than log2m IHI plus a constant
C1 number of experiments to uniquely determine any individual hypothesis in the
initial hypothesis space H.
Why is this true? Consider that (a) each initial hypothesis space H is randomly
chosen from the set of all binary functions, (b) each experiment has 2' outcomes,
and (c) there are IHI initial hypothesis. Also consider that a complete decision
tree for IHI items, where each item has 2m outcomes, will have depth of loge,,. iHi.
Therefore, we should expect an experiment selector to need to perform an average
of loge,,, IHI experiments to uniquely determine any individual hypothesis, where
log2m IHI is the maximum entropy possible for the initial hypothesis space. This
is not surprising, as [Shannon:48] pointed out: the maximum entropy for a set of
items is also the minimal number of decisions needed to exactly specify any item.
These results imply that the number of available experiments has no real effect
on the performance. Only the number of outcomes per experiment and the initial12
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Figure 41. Modeling the Performance of GREEDY.
Each data point is the result of 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions per trial. Performance of
GREEDY is given as 0.430 + 0.965log2M II/1 with R2 = 0.998 using linear regression.
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Figure 42. Modeling the Performance of RELEVANT.
Each data point is the result of 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions per trial. Performance of
RELEVANT is given as 0.704 + 0.9601og2m IHI with R2 = 0.995 using linear regression to fit the
above data points.102
Table 8. Effect that Specialized Hypothesis Spaces have on Performance of the Experiment
eiec
1 -term Disjunctive Normal Form
Effect
ORACLE
Estimate ± Standard
GREEDY
Error
RELEVANT RANDOM
Overall Average Performance 4.74 ± 0.058.32 ± 0.139.29 ± 0.1412.62 ± 0.16
Effect of Changing
H from random to 1-term DNF
WI from 81 to 243
0.35 ± 0.10
0.81 ± 0.10
2.31 ± 0.25
2.83 ± 0.25
3.67 ± 0.28
3.37 ± 0.28
8.18 ± 0.32
5.71 ± 0.32
Interaction when
Simultaneously Changing
H space type and IHI -0.07 ± 0.101.27 ± 0.251.72 ± 0.284.20 ± 0.32
Significance Level ±0.46 ±1.16 ±1.27 ±1.49
1- Decision List
Effect
ORACLE
Estimate ± Standard
GREEDY
Error
RELEVANT RANDOM
Overall Average Performance 8.05 ± 0.0312.40 ± 0.0313.50 ± 0.0516.85 ± 0.05
Effect of Changing
H from random to 1-DL
IHI from 1051 to 25,037
-2.16 ± 0.06
2.01 ± 0.06
0.84 ± 0.06
4.19 ± 0.06
2.41 ± 0.10
5.14 ± 0.10
7.32 ± 0.11
8.54 ± 0.11
Interaction when
Simultaneously Changing
H space type and IHI -1.05 ± 0.060.31 ± 0.061.33 ± 0.104.90 ± 0.11
Significance Level ±0.29 ±0.29 ±0.44 ±0.50
This shows the results of a 2-level factorial analysis on the size of the hypothesis space 11/1 and
how the initial hypothesis space was selected (from 1-DL or 1-term DNF verses all binary
functions). Minimal significance level shows the minimum value an effect or interaction must
have to be significant (p > 0.995 using a weighted t distribution). For 1-term DNF the results
are from 27, 81, 243, and 500 repeated trials (for IHI = 27, 81, 243, and 729 respectively), 50
repetitions per trial (no repetitions for ORACLE). For 1-DL the results are from 97, 500, and
500 repeated trials (for IHI = 97, 1050, and 15,036 respectively), 50 repetitions per trial (no
repetitions for ORACLE).
hypothesis space size have a major influence on the number of experiments required
by either GREEDY Or RELEVANT.
When comparing the performance of GREEDY, RELEVANT, and RANDOM on a
per-trial basis, we see a slightly different picture than comparing the overall av-
erages. Figures 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50 show each repeated trial sorted
according to how the selectors did in comparison to each other. This gives an ac-
count of how often each selector outperformed other selectors on a per-trial basis.
If gr, re/, and ran are the performances of GREEDY, RELEVANT, and RANDOM for
a given repeated trial then the categories we recorded were named and defined as1 .00 -,
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Figure 43. Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis for Hypothesis Spaces
with n = 2, m = 1.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 33 above.
follows:
GR.REL..RANa"ranrel > relgr,
GR..REL.RAN ranrel < re/gr,
REL.GR..RAN F...:rangr > grre/,
REL..GR.RAN rangr < grrel,
REL.RAN.GRErel < ran < gr.
The category names provide a shorthand for the definitions.For example, the
categoryGR.REL..RANis interpreted as "repeated trials whereGREEDY'Sperfor-
mance was best,RANDOM'sperformance was worst, andRELEVANTwas closer
toGREEDYthan toRANDOMin performance." In Figure 43, whenGR.REL..RAN
= 0.664 for IHI = 5, this means that 66.4% of the IIII = 5 trials fell in this cat-
egory. Thus the only category whereRELEVANTis not as good as or better than
GREEDY IS GR..REL.RAN.This says in most casesRELEVANTis a good approxima-
tion ofGREEDYfor a very small value of in, butRELEVANTis closer toRANDOM
in performance for larger values of in.
The robustness of a method is measured by the standard deviation of the
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Figure 44.Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis for Hypothesis Spaces
with n = 3,m = 2.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 34 above.
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Figure 45. Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis for Hypothesis Spaces
with n = 4, m = 1.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 35 above.Categories
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Figure46.Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis for Hypothesis Spaces
with n = 4,m = 2.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 36 above.
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Figure 47. Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis using 1-term DNF.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 37 above.Categories
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Figure 48.Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis Using Hypothesis
Spaces Equivalent in Size to 1-term DNF Spaces.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 38 above.
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Figure 49. Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis using 1-DL.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 39 above.1.00 -
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Figure 50. Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis Using Hypothesis
Spaces Equivalent in Size to 1-DL Spaces.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 40 above.
selector's performance.GREEDYandORACLEare obviously more robust than
RELEVANTandRANDOMfrom comparison of the standard deviations (Figures 51,
52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58) for a small number of experimental outcomes. As
the number of outcomes increases, all four have a smaller standard deviation, but
GREEDYand RELEVANT move away from ORACLE and closer toRANDOM.
Now that we have considered overall performance, per-trial relative perfor-
mance, 2-level factorial analysis, and robustness, we conclude with a discussion of
the computational cost of implementing each experiment selector. As in Chapter
Four, we disregard the actual cost of conducting each experiment and focus only
on the cost of selecting which experiment to perform. As we discussed in Chapter
Four,RANDOMcan be implemented in time 0(k log k), where k is the number of
experiments that must be selected. Hence, it is very cheap.
In contrast, we believe thatGREEDYis very expensive to implement in general.
The most straightforward implementation requires enumerating all available exper-
iments 2" and all possible hypotheses IHI and determining the predicted outcome
of each experiment according to each hypothesis. This is exceedingly expensive2
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Figure51. Robustness of the Experiment Selectors with n = 3,m = 1.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 33 above, with 25,000 trials for each
data point (500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).
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Figure 52. Robustness of the Experiment Selectors with n = 3,m = 2.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 34 above, with 25,000 trials for each
data point (500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).3
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Figure 53.Robustness of the Experiment Selectors with n = 4, m = 1.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 35 above, with 25,000 trials for each
data point (500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).
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Figure 54.Robustness of the Experiment Selectors with n = 4, m = 2.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 36 above, with 25,000 trials for each
data point (500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).20
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Figure 55. Robustness of the Experiment Selectors with 1-term DNF.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 37 above. There were 1,350, 4,050,
12,150, and 25,000 trials for each data point (for IHI =27, 81, 243, and 729 respectively).
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Figure 56. Robustness of the Experiment Selectors using Hypothesis Spaces Equivalent in Size
to 1-term DNF Spaces.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 38 above. There were 25,000 trials for
each data point (up to 500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).5-
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Figure 57.Robustness of the Experiment Selectors with 1-DL.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 39 above. There were 4,840, 25,000, and
25,000 trials for each data point (for WI =97, 1050, and 15,036 respectively).
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Figure 58. Robustness of the Experiment Selectors using Hypothesis Spaces Equivalent in Size
to 1-DL Spaces.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 40 above. There were 25,000 trials for
each data point (up to 500 repeated trials each with 50 repeats).112
(2n x (HI). In particular domains, it might be possible to perform this calculation
indirectly by exploiting regularities and abstractions in the hypothesis space. How-
ever, it is likely that any method will require considering all available experiments
at each point.
Fortunately, RELEVANT can be implemented relatively efficiently.One ap-
proach would be to explicitly generate two hypotheses h1 and h2. Then, we could
generate experiments at random, one at a time, and check to see if h1 and h2
predict different outcomes on each generated experiment. As soon as such an ex-
periment is found, it can be performed, since it is guaranteed to be a relevant
experiment. If we assume that it is possible to compute the predicted outcome of
an hypothesis for a proposed experiment in polynomial time, then this approach
will require time polynomial in the number of available experiments.
A more direct approach would be to generate h1 and h2 as before, but rather
than generating and testing experiments, we could compare h1 and h2 directly to
find a discriminating experiment. The direct comparison of two hypotheses could
be extremely expensive. Indeed, it is easy to reduce the problem of Boolean sat-
isfiability to the problem of comparing two arbitrary Boolean functions to find an
assignment that makes one true and the other false. Hence, in general, this ap-
proach is NP-complete. However, for restricted classes of hypotheses (e.g., deter-
ministic finite automata, 1-term DNF, k-DNF), the comparison can be performed
in polynomial time.
Overall we conclude that the small gains in performance from deriving experi-
ment bias from preference bias are far from cost effective. Also, no training exam-
ple selector approached the performance of the oracle, implying that self-selected
training examples are not as effective as tutor-selected training examples. Even
so, RELEVANT is an extremely attractive selector:it falls between GREEDY and
RANDOM in performance, robustness, and cost. Also RELEVANT does not require
fully enumerating the hypothesis space (as GREEDY and EXHAUSTIVE d0).113
In summary, the most effective experiment selection criterion was to select
relevant experiments, deriving experiment bias from the restricted hypothesis space
bias.114
Chapter 6
Meta Experiment 3: Effect of Structural
Experimentation
We have seen that a simple experiment bias (REL EVA NT) works very well when
using experiments to discover the function of an unknown system. The small
performance improvement yielded by complex experiment biases (like EXHAUSTIVE
and GREEDY) is more than offset by the cost of computing the bias.It is very
encouraging that a simple bias performs almost as well as a complex bias. We also
saw that no experiment bias performed as well as the ORACLE , but that GREEDY
and RELEVANT performed well with respect to the normative model of the ideal
(EXHAUSTIVE) experimenter.
All of the experiments we have studied so far have been functional experi-
ments, which gather information about the input/output function exhibited by
the unknown system. As we discussed in Chapter One, however, there are many
real-world situations where experiments can provide information about the inter-
nal structure of the unknown system. For example, dissection of organisms has
been an extremely valuable experimental technique in biology. Such structural
experiments seem to be quite different from simple functional experiments.In
this chapter, we explore the question of whether the results we have obtained for
functional experiments carry over to structural experiments.
For the purposes of this dissertation, the function of an unknown system is sim-
ply its externally observable behavior. In previous chapters, we have represented115
this behavior as an "experiment result table" that shows the output produced by
the unknown system for each possible experiment. This is a direct generalization
of the familiar truth table that can be used to unambiguously describe any binary
function.
In contrast, the structure of an unknown system consists of some combination
of subsystems interconnected in specified ways. Given the structure of a system,
the function of the system can usually be computed from this structure by applying
some collection of rules that describe how the functions of the individual subsys-
tems combine when they are interconnected. These rules are usually the laws of
physics (or, as appropriate, chemistry, electronics, etc.). Hence, once the structure
of a system is known, the function is known as well. However, the reverse is rarely
true, since there is generally a many-to-one relationship between structures and
functions.
A structural experiment provides some way of observing the subsystems inside
the unknown system and their interconnections. The obvious way to represent
the structure of a system is to represent it as a topological graph showing the
internal subsystems (as nodes) and their interconnections (as arcs). This is the way
that the structure of molecules is represented (as atoms and bonds), for example.
However, for a given set of structural experiments, it is also possible to construct
an "experiment result table" that describes each structure simply in terms of the
outcomes of every possible structural experiment. This representation makes it
easy to characterize all structures that can be experimentally distinguished, and
we will find it very useful.However, it does make it awkward to compute the
function from the structure. Hence, in our meta-experiments, we maintain two
coordinated representations of structure: as an experiment result table and as a
subsystem/interconnection graph.
Given the relationship between structure and function, one can imagine two
quite different goals that a scientist might adopt. The first goal, as in the previ-
ous chapters, is to determine the function of the unknown system. This could be116
accomplished either by (a) performing only functional experiments, as in previous
chapters, (b) performing only structural experiments to identify the structure and
then computing its function, or (c) performing a mix of structural and functional
experiments. Interestingly, because of the many-to-one relationship between struc-
tures and functions, it is not necessary to completely identify the structure in order
to know the function. It suffices to narrow down the structural hypotheses to a
set of structures that all produce the same function.
The second possible goal of a scientist would be to completely identify the
structure of the unknown system (and indirectly, the function as well). This could
be accomplished most directly by (d) performing only structural experiments.
In this chapter, we describe three meta-experiments that explore cases (b), (c),
and (d). Case (a) has been studied in detail in the preceding chapters. Our goal
is to determine whether RELEVANT 15 still the most cost-effective and whether it
is still close in performance to GREEDY.
Meta-experiment 3.1. Determine the function of the unknown system by per-
forming only structural experiments.
Meta-experiment 3.2. Determine the function of the unknown system by per-
forming a mix of functional and structural experiments.
Meta-experiment 3.3. Determine the structure of the unknown system by per-
forming only structural experiments.
In order to conduct these experiments, we needed to develop a domain in
which each unknown system had structure as well as function. We chose to stay
in the domain of binary functions, and hence, we adopted the well-known space of
Boolean logic circuits to provide the structural space for this study.
Because we were able to study structure and function in only one domain, the
results in this chapter are less general than those of previous chapters. However,
we believe the results here provide a basic understanding of the issues and suggest
interesting directions for future research.117
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.First, we review the
structural domain of Boolean circuits and describe the methods that we applied to
generate structural hypotheses and learn with them. Then we describe the three
meta-experiments and discuss their results.
6.1The Structural Domain
The functional domain employed in this dissertation so far has been the domain
of binary functions having n inputs and m outputs. Because we wished to retain
this functional domain in this chapter, we chose a structural domain where each
structure computes one of these n-input, m-output binary functions. Specifically,
we chose the domain of state-free combinational logic circuits. The subsystems in
this structural domain are the three simple primitive logic circuits that compute
Boolean AND, OR, and NOT. These subsystems are interconnected by wires. The
laws of Boolean logic can be easily applied to compute the function of a circuit
from its structure.
Of course there is a many-to-one relationship between circuits and binary func-
tions. In fact, there are infinitely many implementations of any binary function.
To make the space of possible structures finite, we chose to consider only logic
circuits containing 5 or fewer gates. Furthermore, we restricted attention to on-
ly binary functions having three inputs and one output, of which there are 256
possible functions.
To perform the meta-experiments, we needed three databases (Figure 59 pre-
sents a schematic diagram of these three databases). The first database, as in
previous chapters, contains 256 experiment result tables, one for each possible
function. This database is used by the learning component to decide which func-
tions are consistent with an observed functional training example (input-output
pair).
The second database lists the relationship between structures and functions.Database Number 1
Function
Number
Result
Table
0 (000 00000)
1 (000 00001)
. .
. .
. .
255 (111 11111)
118
Database Number 2
Function
Number
Structure Numbers that
Implement this Function
0 0,3,4, 11,...
1 2,25,36, 78,...
.
255 1,10,12,...
Database Number 3
Structure
Number
Structural Result Tables
Input Experiments Output Experiments Gate ID Experiments
0
1
.
.
255
<(node 4 input 1,1)...>
<(node 4 input 1,3)...>
.
<(node 4 input 1,2)...>
<(node 1,<node 4 input 1>)...>
<(node 1,<node 3 input 2>)...>
.
<(node 1,<node 7 input 2>)...>
<(node 4,AND)...>
<(node 4,0R)...>
.
<(node 4,NOT)...>
Figure 59. Illustration of the Three Databases Used for Structural Experimentation.
Each row in the database points to a function (as an experiment result table) and
the structures that implement function.
The third database describes the relationship between structures and struc-
tural experiments. Each row in the database points to a structure and gives an
experiment result table that lists the result of each possible structural experiment
when performed on the indicated structure.
These databases are used as follows. In the first meta-experiment, where the
goal is to discover the function of an unknown system by performing only struc-
tural experiments, the learning component takes the outcome of each structural
experiment and consults the third database to determine which structures are con-
sistent with that outcome. This typically eliminates some structures from further
consideration.
The learning component then consults the second database to find every func-
tion for which there is still at least one structure under consideration implementing
that function. Those functions that no longer have any structure consistent with
the experimental data are deleted from the first database. When only one func-
tion remains in the first database, the process is terminated, and that function is
assumed to be the correct function of the unknown system.119
In the second meta-experiment, where both functional and structural experi-
ments are permitted, the learning component is slightly more complex. The results
of structural experiments are processed as described above. However, the results
of functional experiments involve the reverse procedure. First, the first database
is consulted, and all functions that are inconsistent with the experimental results
are deleted from that database. Then, the second database is consulted, to find all
structures that implement some function still under consideration. Then, the third
database is processed to remove all experiment result tables for structures that im-
plement functions that have been eliminated from consideration. Experimentation
halts when there is only one function remaining in the first database. In short,
information about structural hypotheses that have been eliminated is propagated
(via the second, structure-function, database) to eliminate functional hypotheses
and vice versa.
Finally, the third meta-experimentwhere the goal is simply to identify the
structure of the unknown system by performing structural experimentsis the
simplest. Only the third database is considered. After each structural experiment
is performed, all structures inconsistent with the outcome of that experiment are
deleted from the third database. When only one structure remains in the database,
the process is terminated.
6.2Representing Structures and Structural Experiments
Each circuit structure can be represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) in
which the nodes are primitive gates (AND, OR, and NOT) and the arcs are wires.
The arcs are directed, because signals flow from the outputs of gates to the inputs
of other gates and not the reverse. The graphs are acyclic, because feedback (and
hence, internal state) is not permitted. Figure 60 shows the graph representation
for a typical combinational logic circuit.
To carry out the meta-experiments, it is necessary to choose some collection ofDAG
5
6
23
120
Typical Logic Circuits Derived from a DAG
Figure 60. Example of a DAG and its an associated Circuit.
structural experiments. One can imagine many different kinds of experiments that
can be performed on a circuit structure. Some of these are purely structural (e.g.,
they only provide information about the nodes and arcs of the graph), while others
combine structure and function. An example of a purely structural experiment is
an experiment that determines which two gates a given wire is connected to. An
example of a mixed structure/function experiment is one in which an AND gate
is replaced by an OR gate while values are placed on the inputs and the resulting
circuit output is observed. This is analogous to genetic mutation experiments in
biology or board-swapping in hardware diagnosis.
We chose to study pure structural experiments only. We selected the following
three types of experiments: input connectivity, output connectivity, and gate type
(Figure 61 show example result tables for each). These are defined as follows:
Input connectivity experiments are used to discover what node is at the other
end of an incoming arc. Nodes may have one or two incoming arcs, so the
experiment must explicitly specify arc "1" or arc "2" (the left and right-most
arcs respectively). If a node or arc does not exist, the result of the experiment
is "NIL".Structure
Structural Training Examples
Input Connectivity Gate ID
(node4input1,1) (node4,AND)
(node4input2,2) (node5,AND)
(node5input1,4) (node6,AND)
(node5input2,3) (node7,nil)
(node6input1,4) (node8,nil)
(node6input2,5)
(node7input1,6)
(node7input2,nil)
(node8input1,nil)
(node8input2,nil)
Output Connectivity
(node1,<node4input 1>)
(node2,<node4input 2>)
(node3,<node5input 2>)
(node4,<node5input l,node 6input 1>)
(node5,<node6input 2>)
(node6,<node7input 1>)
(node7,nil)
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Figure 61. A Example Structure and its Characterizing Training Examples.
This shows a seven node circuit (three gates) along with the set of all training examples that
exactly characterize this structure. Any structure we generate can be exactly specified by a
similar set of training examples.
Output connectivity experiments are used to discover what nodes are at the
other end of all outgoing arcs. Because there is no limit to the number of
outgoing arcs, the result of this experiment is a list of nodes. If a node does
not exist, the result of the experiment is "NIL".
Gate type experiments are used to discover what gate type a node was mapped
to (i.e., AND, OR, INVERTER). If a node does not exist, the result of the
experiment is "NIL".
Notice that any circuit can be uniquely determined by a mix of only output and
gate or input and gate experiments. This is because any DAG may be specified
by either listing the input connections or the output connections. Then only the
gate types need to be listed to specify which circuit the DAG was mapped to.
Hence, there is redundancy in the training example space. This might be expected
to causeRANDOMto perform worse,but it could helpGREEDYto approach the122
ORACLE (because of a wider selection of experiments to choose from). It should
not cause RELEVANT to perform worse, because (from Chapter Five) the number
of experiments available has no effect on RELEVANT'S performance.
6.3Generating the Three Databases
We now describe the implementation details of generating the three databas-
es described above. The first database, containing functional experiment result
tables, is very easy to generate, since our Boolean functions are defined by their
truth tables.
Our strategy for generating the second and third databases was to first gen-
erate the set of all structures represented as circuits. From each circuit, we can
then apply the rules of Boolean logic to determine which Boolean function it com-
putes. This information constitutes the second database. Finally, we can apply
the definitions for the three types of structural experiments to compute structural
experiment result tables for each circuit. This information is entered into the third
database. We now describe these steps in more detail.
The process of generating the circuits involves two steps. First, we generate all
distinct (i.e., non-isomorphic) graphs satisfying certain requirements (as described
below). Then, we convert each graph into several distinct circuits by assigning
AND, OR, and NOT gates to the internal nodes in the graph.
We chose some arbitrary conventions for this dissertation to reduce the com-
plexity of manipulating DAGs and circuits.All DAGs have their sources (i.e.,
inputs) at the top and their sink (i.e., output) at the bottom. Nodes are numbered
from top to bottom, left to right. All arcs are assumed to be directed downwards
(this saves drawing the arrows).
We must generate DAGs that meet certain restrictions, so we can map them
onto circuits that implement the binary functions we are interested in.These
restrictions are:123
1. Circuits must have three inputs and one output, so the DAGs must have
exactly three sources and one sink.
2. Circuits must be implemented with AND, OR, and INVERTER gates, so all
internal nodes for the DAGs must have exactly one or two incoming edges.
3. Gates (and the circuit inputs) may have unlimited fan-out, so any number
of edges may leave an internal node or the DAG sources.
4. The DAG sink must have exactly one input, so exactly one edge may enter
the sink.
5. The DAG may have no more than five internal nodes (since each circuit may
have up to five gates).
We used exhaustive generate and test to create a database of all DAGs with
three inputs and one output, with up to five internal nodes. All DAGs generated
were also checked against each other to verify that no isomorphic pairs existed
in the database. This test for isomorphism was extremely expensive. At the end
of this process, we had a list of 17,771 non-isomorphic DAGs with from six (the
simplest DAG fitting the above limitations) to nine (an arbitrary maximum) nodes.
Once the DAGs were generated, we mapped each of them into one or more
circuits by assigning AND, OR, and NOT gates to the internal nodes in the DAG.
For internal nodes with exactly one input, there is no choice: they become NOT
gates. For internal nodes with two inputs, either an AND or an OR gate can be
assigned. We performed the assignment in all possible ways. Then we removed
any assignments that introduced isomorphic circuits. This test for isomorphism
can be performed locally, since each circuit need only be compared to other circuits
derived from the same DAG. Figure 62 illustrates this mapping process.
To generate the second database, we converted each circuit into a lisp lambda
expression and evaluated it for all possible combinations of input values. ThisDAG
12 3
Circuit #1Circuit #2Circuit #3Circuit #4
Functions Computed Functions as Result Tables
Circuit
NumberFunction Computed Inputs
a b c
Circuit
12
Number
34
1 (lambda (a b c)
0000000 (and (and a b) c))
0010 0
2 (lambda (a b c) 01000
(or (and a b)c) ) 0110
1000
3 (lambda (a b c) 1010
(and (or a b) c)) 1100
111
4 (lambda (a b c)
(or (or a b) c))
List of (function,structure) pairs
((00 00 00 01),Circuit#1)
(01 01 11 11),Circuit#2)
(00 11 11 11),Circuitt3)
(01 11 11 11),Circuit#4))
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Figure 62. Example of Generating Structural Hypotheses.
This illustrates the method used to generate the structural space. A directed acyclic graph
(DAG) is generated using the restrictions presented in the text. This DAG is mapped into a
number of binary combinational logic circuits. Each internal node is mapped to all possible
combinations of AND, OR, and INVERTER logic gates. These structures are interpreted as
binary combinational logic circuits, and the corresponding logic formulas are generated. Each
function is converted into a result table. This leaves a list of (function, structure) pairs.
produces a functional experiment result table that characterizes the function com-
puted by this circuit.Figure 63 shows an example of this process.Figure 64
summarizes the second database and shows that the mapping between structure
and function is indeed a many-to-one mapping in this domain.
To generate the third database, we applied the definitions of the three kinds ofCircuit
-
Function the Circuit Computes
(lambda (a b c)
(and (and a b) c))4.
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Result Table
Inputsoutput
1 2 3 6
0 0 0 0
0 0 10
0 1 0 0
0 110
1 0 0 0
1 0 10
11 0 0
1111
Figure 63.Example of Computing the Function a given Structure Implements.
Each circuit is interpreted as a binary combinational logic circuit and a corresponding
LAMBDA function is generated for it. This is interpreted and a corresponding result table is
generated.
H
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j
11 1 4_L. 4 .4,A .phi,
64 128 192 256
Function Number
Figure 64.Histogram of the Number of Structures Implementing each Function.
This histogram shows how many structures implemented each function. Function number
corresponds to the output column of the result table being interpreted as an 8-bit binary
number (so the function that returns "0" for every input is "function number 0", the function
that returns "1" for every input is "function number 255", etc.). Notice the extreme skew:
many functions have less than ten structural implementation while a very few functions have
thousands of implementations.Associated
Circuit
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Result Table Representation
Experimental Results
Node Number Gate Type
123 45 67 89 nil and or not
4 1+
2 +
5 1 ..+...
.4" 2..+ ....
2 +
7 1 +
2 +
8 1
2
1 23 44 55 66 7 7 8 8 9 nil and or not
12 12 12 1 2 1 2
1
2
3
4 +
8 5
6
7
1 23 45 67 89 nil and or not
0
4 +
5 +
2. 6 + a 7 +
8 +
Figure 65. Example of Generating a Structural Result Table from a DAG.
This is the "result table" for the structural hypothesis space. An example DAG, an associated
circuit, and the circuits result table are also shown.
structural experiments and generated a structural experiment result table for each
circuit. Figure 65 illustrates this process, and Figure 66 describes the format of
these experiment result tables in general.
6.4Structural Hypothesis Bias
Now that we have chosen a domain of structures, defined a set of structural
experiments, and constructed the three databases, we have everything necessary
to perform the three meta-experiments. However, before proceeding, it is helpful
to consider the role that structural hypotheses and experiments play in defining
the bias of the learning component.
In the previous chapters, we have discussed at length two forms of bias: re-
stricted hypothesis space bias and preference bias. In this chapter, we will focusExperimental Results
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Figure 66. Pictorial Definition of the Structural Result Table.
This is the "result table" for the structural hypothesis space. At the left are all possible
experimental input values and across the top all possible associated results. The limitations
noted in the table are from constraints for generating DAGs and for mapping DAGs to circuits.
"Not Possible" specifies impossible output values for a given input value (e.g., gates are not of
type "1" or "2"). "DAG limits" are because of our defining edges as "downward" and node
numbering as from top to bottom, so an edge cannot go from a higher numbered node to a
lower numbered node without creating a circuit (and thus is no longer a DAG). "Every column
must have at least one `+' " assures that every node has something connected to its output.
"Only one entry per row" (in the input portion of the table) assures each node input has a
single incoming edge. "Any number of entries per row" assures an unlimited number of
outgoing edges per node.
only on restricted hypothesis space bias, since we have seen that preference bias
has little effect on the number of experiments required to rule out all incorrect
hypotheses.
There are four ways in which circuit structures lead to restricted hypothesis
space biases. First, because there are infinitely many circuits, it was necessary for
us to impose a restriction on the maximum number of gates (5) in a circuit. This128
restriction is arbitrary; it was imposed to make the meta-experiments feasible.
Second, the use of structural experiments to acquire information about circuit
structures creates a restricted hypothesis space bias similar to the biases discussed
in the previous chapters. To see this, consider the third meta-experiment, where
the goal is to determine the structure of the unknown system by performing struc-
tural experiments. Because each of these structures (circuits) can be represented
as a structural experiment result table, the task in meta-experiment 3 is formally
identical to the tasks described in Chapters Three and Four. A space of hypothe-
ses, H, is provided, where each hypothesis is represented as an experiment result
table. The goal is to perform experiments and eliminate incorrect hypotheses until
only one hypothesis remains. In Chapters Three and Four, we generally studied
hypothesis spaces that were randomly-drawn subsets of the space of all possible
result tables. In this chapter, however, the experiment result tables correspond to
realizable circuits. Hence, this constraintthat the experiment result table corre-
spond to a possible circuitcan also be viewed as restricting the set of experiment
result tables to be considered.
How substantial is this restriction? In other words, what is the relationship be-
tween the space of 97,104 structural hypotheses (represented as experiment result
tables) and the space of all possible result tables?
To answer this question, let us compute the size of the smallest complete result
table that could represent our structural result tables. To do this, we need to
know the number of experiments and the maximum number of outcomes for those
experiments. By examining Figure 66 again, we see that there are 22 experiments
possible (10 input connectivity experiments, 7 output connectivity experiments,
and 5 gate type experiments). The maximum number of outcomes is 10 for the
output experiments, since outputs of gates (or of the input terminals) can be
connected to any one of up to two inputs to the gates. Hence, there are 210 = 1024
possible outcomes of an output experiment. The smallest complete result table
would therefore have 22 experiments with 1024 results per experiment. There are129
Table 9. Number of Functional and Structures Implemented for a Node Count.
Circuit Node
Count
Total Structures
Implemented
Minimal Structures
Implemented
Functions
Implemented
6 24 24 8
7 324 228 61
8 5,016 984 115
9 91,740 1,212 197
Total 97,104 1,212 197
197 of the 256 possible functions were implemented. Note that most of the functions are
implemented by the larger structures.
102422 possible result tables, which means that the total possible hypothesis space
contains more than 1066 hypotheses.
From this analysis, we can see that the actual hypothesis space we are con-
sidering is a vanishingly small fraction of the total hypothesis space. Hence, this
second form of restricted hypothesis space bias is very strong indeed.
The third way that circuit structures impose a restricted hypothesis space is
evident in the first two meta-experiments of this chapter (meta-experiments 3.1 and
3.2). Here, the goal is to identify the function of the system using, at least in part,
structural experiments. It turns out that the 97,104 circuit structures implement
only 197 of the 256 possible 3-input, 1-output Boolean functions.Hence, the
functional hypothesis space is restricted by the constraint that each function be
implemented by a circuit with five or fewer gates. However, this restriction is not
very substantial.
Finally, this requirement (that every functional hypothesis be realized by a
circuit) can be tightened to state that every functional hypothesis is realized by
an efficient circuit. Very often in engineering and science, it is assumed that the
designer of the unknown circuit did a good jobthe circuit should contain no
unnecessary gates. If we impose this bias, we obtain the fourth kind of restricted
hypothesis space.
Specifically, in the meta-experiments of this chapter we will consider two dif-
ferent restrictions on the space of possible circuits, which we will call feasible and130
optimal. Under the feasible restriction, we will consider only the 97,104 circuits
implementable with 5 or fewer gates. Under the optimal bias, we will consider
only the 1,212 circuits that are optimal in the following sense: For each Boolean
function, we will include only those circuits that implement that function with the
fewest number of gates. Even with the optimal bias, there is still a many-to-one
mapping from structures to functions, because often there is more than one opti-
mal circuit implementing the same function. Table 9 provides some statistics on
these biases.
To summarize, in meta-experiments 3.1 and 3.2, the space of functional hy-
potheses is restricted, because some Boolean functions do not have small (5 gates
or fewer) circuit implementations. The space of structural hypotheses can be re-
stricted in two ways: feasible bias and optimal bias. In meta-experiment 3.3, the
space of structural experiment result tables is drastically restricted by the require-
ment that each table must correspond to a well-formed circuit of 5 or fewer gates.
Now that we understand the sources and characteristics of our restricted hy-
pothesis space biases, we are ready to analyze the three experiments of this chapter.
6.5Meta-experiment 3.1: Learning Function from Struc-
tural Experiments
The purpose of this meta-experiment was to investigate the relative perfor-
mance of the different training example selectors when they have access to only
structural examples, and they are attempting to discover the function of the un-
known system.
6.5.1Methodology
As in the earlier meta-experiments, the basic operation we performed is called
a trial. This consisted of selecting a functional hypothesis space (along with its
associated structural space), choosing one function in that space to be the "correc-131
t" hypothesis (unknown system), then choosing one structure that implemented
that function to be the "correct" structure of the unknown system. Each selector
(except the ORACLE) involved a random component, so to determine the average
performance for a given trial we performed a repeated trial, which consisted of
running each of the experiment selectors 50 times on the same randomly chosen
hypothesis space. Most of the performance data presented below consists of the
average of 250 or 500 repeated trials, each trial the average of 50 repeats. For
the robustness data, we used the standard deviation of the performance for each
repeat (i.e., the standard deviation of 12,500 or 25,000 trials).
The only experiments allowed are the three types of structural experiments:
input connectivity, output connectivity, and gate identification (22 experiments
total). The "exact" stopping criterion was usedthe unknown system has been
understood when exactly one functional hypothesis remains (notice that there may
be many structures remaining in the structural hypothesis space as long as they all
implement this single remaining function). There was no preference bias. We con-
sidered both "feasible" (97,104 circuits) and "optimal" (1,212 circuits) restricted
hypothesis space biases for the structural hypothesis space.
The independent variables were:
The training example source:
RANDOM, RELEVANT, GREEDY, ORACLE.
Restricted hypothesis space bias 13 : 10, 11n {0, 1}m:
Functions (and associated structures) randomly chosen from all binary
functions
n = 3,m = 1 : IHI = 5,10,20,40,80,160,197;
Optimality of Structures:
optimal (up to 1212 structures), feasible (up to 97,104 structures).28 7
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Figure 67. Performance of the Experiment Selectors with Randomly Selected Hypothesis Spaces
and "Feasible" Structures.
Results are from 250 repeated trials, 50 repetitions of RANDOM, RELEVANT, and GREEDY per
trial (no repetitions for ORACLE).
6.5.2Results
There was no significant relative change in the effectiveness of the experiment
selectors from the use of structural information. The only unexpected result was
that RELEVANT did better than expected in the per-trial analysis. In overall per-
formance and robustness all experiment selectors' behavior was consistent with
results from Chapter Five.
Figure 67 shows the performance of the four experiment selectors under the
"feasible" restricted hypothesis space bias. Notice that RANDOM performs much
worse than the other three.This can be explained by the fact that there are
many possible experiments in this domain, and, unlike the other three experiment
selectors, the performance of RANDOM was shown in Chapter Five to degrade as
the number of available experiments becomes large.
Notice also that GREEDY performs very well and comes quite close to the o R A-
CL E . This can also be explained from our previous experiments, because in Chapter
Five we saw that the performance of GREEDY improves (relative to RELEVANT)
as the number of experimental outcomes increases. In the domain of structural7
random
relevant
greedy
13
oracle 13
0 40 80 120 160 200
Hypothesis Space Size
133
Figure 68. Performance of the Experiment Selectors with Randomly Selected Hypothesis Spaces
and "Optimal" Structures.
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions of RANDOM, RELEVANT, and GREEDY per
trial (no repetitions for ORACLE).
experiments, there are up to 81 actual outcomes (out of 1024 possible).
Figure 68 shows the performance of the four selectors under the "optimal"
bias for the structural hypothesis space. The performance of all of the selectors
improves, of course, because the size of the hypothesis space is much smaller.
Figures 69 and 70 summarize the per-trial performance of the four selectors.
Here, RELEVANT performs surprisingly well.Based on the results of previous
chapters, we would have expected the GR..REL.RAN category to dominate, because
structural experiments have so many possible outcomes. However, instead the
GR.REL..RAN category dominates, because RANDOM performs so poorly when so
many experiments are available. A further reason for RANDOM'S poor performance
is that the experiments in this domain are redundant. As we described above, input
connectivity experiments and output connectivity experiments provide the same
information. RANDOM does not take this into account, whereas RELEVANT and
GREEDY do.
Looking at the robustness (Figure 71 and 72) of the selectors we again see
results consistent with the previous chapters.V .00
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Figure 69. Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis using "Feasible"Struc-
tures.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 67 above.
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Figure 70. Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis using "Optimal"Struc-
tures.
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Figure 71.Robustness of the Experiment Selectors using "Feasible" Structures.
Results are from 12,500 data points (250 repeated trials, 50 repetitions per trial) for RANDOM,
RELEVANT, and GREEDY (no repetitions for ORACLE).
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Figure 72.Robustness of the Experiment Selectors using "Optimal" Structures.
Results are from 25,000 data points (500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions per trial) for RANDOM,
RELEVANT, and GREEDY (no repetitions for ORACLE).136
Hence, structural information, in the form of a result table, did not result in a
change in overall behavior of the experiment selectors. There was no significant net
change in the effectiveness of the experiment selectors from the use of structural
information.
We now look at the effect on selector performance of permitting the selector to
perform a mix of functional and structural experiments.
6.6Meta-experiment 3.2: Learning Function from Func-
tional and Structural Experiments
The purpose of this meta-experiment was to investigate the relative perfor-
mance of the different training example selectors when they have access to both
functional and structural examples. We were also interested in any preference a
given selector might have for one type of experiment over the other. In essence, the
only change from meta-experiment 3.1 is the addition of functional experiments.
Another purpose of this experiment was to investigate the relative power of
structural and functional experiments. Many scientists have an intuition, which
we share, that structural experiments are "more powerful" than functional ex-
periments. It is certainly true that structural experiments provide information
namely, information about the structure of the unknown systemthat cannot be
obtained from functional experiments because of the many-to-one relationship be-
tween structures and functions. But our intuition is that structural experiments
are also a more effective way of learning about the function of any unknown system.
Plausible arguments can be put forward on both sides of this question. Cer-
tainly, structural experiments have many more possible outcomes, so they provide
more bits of information per experiment. However, there are also many more
structural hypotheses than functional ones (97,104 versus 197), so more bits of
information are needed to eliminate all of those incorrect structural hypotheses.
One way to resolve this issue is to see which experiments are preferred by the137
experiment selectors (particularly the ORACLE) when both kinds of experiments
are available. However, there is a flaw with this line of argument. The answer
could depend on what counts as a single "structural experiment." The structural
experiments that we defined in Section 6.2 provide a modest amount of information.
More information could be provided by an experiment such as "tell me all of gates
that are connected to gate k as either inputs or outputs". Less information could be
provided by output connectivity experiments if we required that the experimental
query specify two gates: "Is input i of gate j connected to the output of gate k?"
Hence, by modifying the "grain size" of structural experiments, we could make
them more powerful or less powerful than functional experiments. This means
that no general statement can be made about the relative power of structural
and functional experiments. The relative power will vary from one domain to
another. The results of this meta-experiment can therefore only be interpreted as
demonstrating the relative power in this particular domain.
6.6.1Methodology
The design of this experiment was identical to the previous one, except that
in addition to the 22 structural experiments, each experiment selector could also
choose one of the 8 functional experiments. Here is a summary of the experiment
design:
The independent variables were:
The training example source:
RANDOM, RELEVANT, GREEDY, ORACLE.
Restricted hypothesis space bias B : {0,1}"H{0, 1}m:
Functions (and associated structures) randomly chosen from all binary
functions
n3,m = 1 : [HI = 5,10, 20,40,80,160,197;138
Optimality of Structures:
optimal (up to 1212 structures), feasible (up to 97,104 structures).
The dependent variable was the number of experiments required to rule out all
but one of the functional hypotheses.
6.6.2Results
There was no significant change in the relative effectiveness of the experiment
selectors from the use of structural and functional information.
Figure 73 shows the performance of all four selectors in this meta-experiment.
When we compare it to Figure 67 (see Table 10) we see that the performance of
RANDOM has worsened as the additional experiments were made available. This is
not surprising, because as the number of available experiments increases, the prob-
ability of choosing an irrelevant experiment increases (particularly if the available
experiments are redundant, as is the case here).
It is surprising that G REEDY 's overall performance improved less than RELE-
VANT's performance did. This can be partly explained by considering Table 11,
which shows the mix of experiments chosen by each selector.If we look at the
ORACLE, we see that the optimal mix of experiments includes almost no func-
tional experiments (3%) and a large fraction of structural experiments (97%). Of
the structural experiments, it is also interesting to note that all three types of
experiments were valuable, even though output experiments have more possible
outcomes than input experiments.
In contrast, G REEDY prefers functional experiments almost exclusively. To un-
derstand why this might be true, consider again how GREEDY works. It simulates
the performance of each available experiment and computes the entropy of the
functional hypothesis space under each possible outcome. It then selects the ex-
periment that is expected to lead to the greatest reduction in entropy (i.e., it prefers
experiments that are expected to eliminate all but lim of the remaining functional139
Table 10. Performance of the Experiment Selectors when using Only Structural Experiments
verses Both Functional and Structural Experiments with "Feasible" Structures.
Experiment Performance of Selector
Selector H= 5 H = 20 H= 80
StructuralBothStructuralBothStructuralBoth
ORACLE 1.8361.592 2.8082.557 4.3764.184
GREEDY 2.4281.956 4.1243.750 5.7805.756
RELEVANT 2.7522.388 5.3204.585 7.6207.160
RANDOM 5.8248.172 9.92412.960 14.24020.220
Data shown are the same used for Figures 67 and 73.
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Figure 73. Performance of the Experiment Selectors with Randomly Selected Hypothesis Spaces
and "Feasible" Structures.
Results are from 250 repeated trials, 50 repetitions of RANDOM, RELEVANT, and GREEDY per
trial (no repetitions for ORACLE).
hypotheses). However, because of the many-to-one relationship between structural
and functional hypotheses, most structural experiments will appear, according to
this measure, to eliminate few (if any functional hypotheses. This is because it is
only by eliminating all of the structural implementations of a functional hypoth-
esis that that hypothesis can be eliminated. Thus GREEDY will prefer functional
experiments, because they tend to eliminate many more functional hypotheses.
RELEVANT, on the other hand, will perform a structural experiment even if it
only eliminates a single functional hypothesis. When looking at the amount the
structural hypothesis space is reduced for a given number of structural experi-140
Table 11.Distribution of Experiment Types Performed by each Experiment Selector Using
"Feasible" Structures.
Experiment
Type ORACLE
Experiment
GREEDY
Selector
RELEVANTRANDOM
Input914(17%) 26( 0%)2865(28%)9371(33%)
Output2125(39%) 116( 1%)2154(21%)6673(23%)
Gate ID2299(42%) 19( 0%)1764(17%)5284(18%)
Functional 167( 3%)8500(98%)3551(34%)7483(26%)
This shows how often each experiment type was selected for the 12,500 trails performed in this
meta-experiment (250 repeated trials each consisting of 50 trials).
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Figure 74. Performance of the Experiment Selectors with Randomly Selected Hypothesis Spaces
and "Optimal" Structures.
Results are from 500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions ofRANDOM, RELEVANT,andGREEDYper
trial (no repetitions forORACLE).Values shown are within 2% of their actual value (p > 0.99).
ments we noticed that often the first structural experiment eliminated only a few
structural hypotheses, the second structural experiment eliminated far more, the
third eliminate a vast number, and so on. Thus, it is necessary to perform a se-
quence of structural experiments in order for any significant number of functional
hypotheses to be eliminated. BecauseRELEVANTperforms occasional structural
experiments, it ends up eliminating a vast number of the structural hypotheses,
and a large number of their associated functional hypotheses. The simple one-step
look-ahead heuristic ofGREEDYfails to detect this. On the other hand, the payoffs
from functional experiments are immediately detectable by one-step look-ahead,141
Table 12. Performance of the Experiment Selectors when using Only Structural Experiments
verses Both Functional and Structural Experiments with "Optimal" Structures.
Experiment Performance of Selector
Selector H= 5 H = 20 H= 80
StructuralBothStructuralBothStructuralBoth
ORACLE 1.0041.002 1.0801.062 1.4321.372
GREEDY 1.0381.028 1.2441.266 2.0341.992
RELEVANT 1.5881.722 2.4882.692 3.4943.698
RANDOM 1.8741.980 3.2163.042 5.2544.298
Data shown are the same used for Figures 68 and 74.
Table 13. Distribution of Experiment Types Performed by each Experiment Selector Using
"Optimal" Structures.
Experiment
Type ORACLE
Experiment
GREEDY
Selector
RELEVANT RANDOM
Input694 (16%) 450 (7%)3528 (32%)4356 (33%)
Output2870 (64%)4104 (67%)2517 (23%)3036 (23%)
Gate ID684 (15%)747 (12%)1865 (17%)2185 (17%)
Functional 207 (5%)806 (13%)3225 (29%)3473 (27%)
This shows how often each experiment type was selected for the 12,500 trails performed in this
meta-experiment (250 repeated trials each consisting of 50 trials).
so GREEDY prefers them. This suggests that a 2- or 3-step look-ahead version of
GREEDY could be worth exploring.
When we consider only "optimal" circuits, the story changes. All of the selec-
tors except RELEVANT actually improve! With optimal circuits, the many-to-one
mapping is greatly reduced (from approximately 493:1 down to approximately 6:1).
Hence, many structural experiments will have the effect of eliminating functional
hypotheses in a single step, SO GREEDY will select them. This is borne out by
Table 12, which shows the distribution of experiment types under the "optimal"
bias. RANDOM 's performance improves, because virtually all the experiments are
now relevant, hence it performs few irrelevant experiments. The performance of
RELEVANT worsens in this case, because when all of the experiments are relevant,
the relevant strategy is equivalent to the random strategy. Hence, RELEVANT'S
performance moves towards RANDOM'S performance.
The experiment selections of o RA CL E shown in Tables 11 and 13 show that, for1.00
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Figure 75. Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis using "Feasible" Struc-
tures.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 73 above.
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Figure 76. Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis using "Optimal" Struc-
tures.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 74 above.
this domain, structural experiments are generally more informative than functional
ones.
The per-trial performance of the four selectors is generally the same as in all
previous experiments, as was the robustness.4
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Figure 77.Robustness of the Experiment Selectors using "Feasible" Structures.
Results are from 12,500 data points (250 repeated trials, 50 repetitions per trial) for RANDOM,
RELEVANT, and GREEDY (no repetitions for ORACLE).
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Figure 78.Robustness of the Experiment Selectors using "Optimal" Structures.
Results are from 25,000 data points (500 repeated trials, 50 repetitions per trial) for RANDOM,
RELEVANT, and GREEDY (no repetitions for ORACLE).144
6.7Meta-experiment 3.3: Learning Structure from Struc-
tural Experiments
This is analogous to the meta-experiments of Chapters Four and Five: a list of
randomly chosen structural result tables forms the initial hypothesis space given
to the learning component. The training example selectors provide structural
examples, the learning component eliminates inconsistent structures until only
one structure remains.
6.7.1Methodology
The design of this experiment is exactly the same as the design of previous
experiments in this chapter. Here is a summary of the experimental conditions.
The independent variables were:
The training example source:
RANDOM, RELEVANT, GREEDY, ORACLE.
Restricted hypothesis space bias:
Structures randomly chosen from structures implementing the 197 func-
tions:
n = 3, m = 1 :
ill] = 5,10,20, 40, 80,160, 240, 320,640,1280, 2560,5120,10240.
The dependent variable was the number of experiments that were performed
before the hypothesis space contained only one remaining hypothesis.
6.7.2Results
There was no significant net change in the effectiveness of the experiment se-
lectors from the use of structural information. The results of this meta-experiment12
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Figure 79. Performance of the Experiment Selectors with Randomly Selected Hypothesis Spaces.
Results are from 250 repeated trials, 50 repetitions of RANDOM, RELEVANT, and GREEDY per
trial (no repetitions for ORACLE).
are entirely consistent with all of the previous meta-experiments. As with meta-
experiment 3.1, the only unusual result is that RELEVANT does substantially better
than RANDOM, because RANDOM is hurt by the large number of available experi-
ments.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this experiment is that the space of
circuit structures, when probed using structural experiments, behaves much like
the randomly-generated hypothesis spaces we studied in Chapter Five. No unusual
properties of this space are evident, and the results from Chapter Five can be
applied.
This concludes the structural meta-experiments. Next we give a synopsis of
the results for this chapter.
6.8Results for Meta-experiment 3
Overall we see that the relative performance of the experiment selectors was
much the same whether using functional or structural experiments or hypotheses.
This is a very promising result: it implies that the experiment selectors are quite.6)
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Figure 80.Performance of the Experiment Selectors on a per-trial Basis.
Data are the same used in the performance plot Figure 79 above.
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Figure 81.Robustness of the Experiment Selectors.
Results are from 12,500 data points (250 repeated trials, 50 repetitions per trial) for RANDOM,
RELEVANT, and GREEDY (no repetitions for ORACLE).147
robust. Given knowledge of the hypothesis space and the training example space,
the effectiveness of each experiment selection method could be predicted with a
fair amount of confidence.
The most interesting result was the poor performance ofG REEDYin meta-
experiment 3.2, because of the short-sightedness of the one-step look-ahead
GREEDYheuristic. The result was that, for "feasible" structures,RELEVANTper-
formed nearly as well asGREEDYin that experiment.
Several regularities have held over the three meta-experiments performed in
this chapter and the meta-experiments from Chapter Four and Five.
Performance. The number of available experiments is irrelevant to the perfor-
mance ofRELEVANT, GREEDYandORACLE.Also the source of experiments
and hypotheses seems irrelevant: there was no significant change in the rela-
tive performance of the selectors from using structural or functional hypothe-
ses or experiments. The number of experimental outcomes and the number
of initial hypotheses considered had an effect on performance ofRELEVANT
andGREEDY.
Robustness. Only the number of experimental outcomes and the number of ini-
tial hypotheses considered have an effect on the robustness ofRELEVANTand
GREEDY. GREEDYwas always more robust, but both selectors were much
closer to theORACLEthan toRANDOM.
Complexity.GREEDYappears too intractable for even the small domain used
in this chapter, because it must consider each possible hypothesis in the
hypothesis space.RELEVANTremained very efficient to execute.
We now draw our overall conclusions for this research; evaluating how well we
answered our initial questions, summarizing the contributions made, and pointing
out future research directions.148
Chapter 7
Analysis and Conclusions
This dissertation introduced four questions about the effectiveness of exper-
imentation, followed by several meta-experiments designed to investigate these
questions empirically. We now attempt to generalize the results given and to eval-
uate how the research presented addressed those questions. Finally we present a
synopsis of the contributions made by this dissertation and discuss several future
research directions.
7.1Evaluation
In Chapter One we introduced four general questions about the effectiveness
of experimentation when learning about an unknown system. We also introduced
the model of an empirical researcher, which consisted of a theorist (learning com-
ponent) and an empiricist (training example selector).
We now recap those questions with a synopsis of the results we obtained for
each, and the implications of these results.
Question 1 Does active experimentation provide more effective training examples
to the theorist than passive observation?
The single largest gain in overall effectiveness was through active control of the
unknown system's inputs149
Our results show that even very simplistic active experimentation requires few-
er experiments for learning than relying on training examples provided by the
environmentit is more advantageous to select your own training examples than
to wait for them. Passive methods have two problems: (a) the same example may
be observed many times and (b) some examples may never be observed. Both
were investigated: (a) caused a major increase in the number of training examples
required to learn and (b) caused the learning component to be unable to differenti-
ate between competing hypotheses (and thus it was unable to "learn" the required
concept).
Our active experiment selector, named RANDOM, contained no knowledge of
the current beliefs of the learning component, but simply tried to avoid the two
problems of passive observation (cited above). Even though RANDOM did not
perform as well as ORACLE,its performance was much closer to ORACLE than to
the passive observer. Active experimentation was also much more robust in its
performance than the passive observer.
We also found that the most significant factors affecting RANDOM'S perfor-
mance were (a) the number of experimental outcomes and (b) the size of the
initial hypothesis space. The total number of experiments available had very little
effect compared to the other two factors. This implies that even the simplest form
of active experimentation is much more effective than learning from environment-
selected training examples, and it is not much worse than learning from ORACLE. It
also implies that, when investigating an unknown system, the experimenter should
attempt to limit the size of the initial hypothesis space and design experiments
that have a large number of outcomes.
Hence, active control is well worth the effort. The next obvious step was to
investigate several methods for exercising that control.
Question 2 What selection criterion should an experimenter apply in choosing an
experiment?150
We defined experiment bias as the criterion used to select the next experiment
and showed several ways to derive it from the theory bias (preference bias and
restricted hypothesis space bias) of the learning system. We also defined a nor-
mative experiment selector, which we named EXHAUSTIVE. Because EXHAUSTIVE
is prohibitively expensive, we defined two approximations to this selector, which
we named GREEDY and RELEVANT. EXHAUSTIVE and GREEDY derive experiment
bias from preference bias, while RELEVANT derives experiment bias from restricted
hypothesis space bias.
The most effective experiment selection criterion was to select relevant experi-
ments, deriving experiment bias from the restricted hypothesis space bias.
Four metrics were used to determine the effectiveness of an experiment bias:
(a) the performance of the bias (overall, per-trial, and using a 2-level factorial
analysis), (b) the robustness of the bias when derived from different theory biases,
and (c) the computational cost of deriving the experiment bias.
On overall performance, preference bias did allow EXHAUSTIVE and GREEDY
to outperform RELEVANT and RANDOM. However, the improvement was a very
small one, and the cost of performing either EXHAUSTIVE or GREEDY is extremely
high. We found that GREEDY performed nearly as well as EXHAUSTIVE, and for
a small fraction of the cost. At no time did any of the experiment selectors ap-
proach the performance of oRACLE, implying that tutoring is more effective than
experimenting.
A per-trial comparison of performance shows that for experiments with only
two outcomes, RELEVANT is a very good approximation to GREEDY. If there are
many outcomes for each experiment, then RELEVANT performs much closer to
RANDOM more often than it performs closer to GREEDY.
A 2-level factorial experiment showed that the number of experiments available
had no real effect on the performance of GREEDY and RELEVANT. Only the number
of experimental outcomes and the hypothesis space size affect performance: the
larger the space size, the worse the performance; the larger the number of outcomes,151
the better the performance. We also found thatGREEDYwas more sensitive to
the number of experimental outcomes, whileRELEVANTwas more sensitive to the
hypothesis space size.
We empirically derived a formula for predicting the average performance of
GREEDYandRELEVANTbased on the results from the 2-level factorial experiment
above. We found that the performance of both can be modeled using just m and
IHI as
Per f ormance = Ci + C2 x logm(IHI),
where 2m is the number of outcomes for each experiment and IHI is the initial
hypothesis space size.
In terms of robustness, we found thatRELEVANTandGREEDYwere both much
closer toORACLE'Srobustness then toRANDOM.
In terms of computational cost,RELEVANTis substantially cheaper to evalu-
ate.GREEDYgenerally requires enumerating the complete hypothesis space, while
RELEVANTonly requires a small number of hypotheses to be enumerated.
These results imply the empirical researcher will be most effective when de-
signing experiments that are relevant. There is no point in designing optimal ex-
periments unless some experiments are very expensive to perform. The researcher
should also try to chose experiments with a large number of outcomes and start
with a small initial hypothesis space. This is in total agreement with the previous
question's results.
Question 3 Are decomposition experiments more effective than functional exper-
iments?
We chose Boolean logic circuits as the structural hypothesis space and defined
a mapping to the space of binary functions investigated above. We then performed
three meta-experiments: (a) using structural experiments to determine the func-
tion of an unknown system, (b) using both functional and structural experiments152
to determine the function of an unknown system, and (c) using structural experi-
ments to determine the structure of an unknown system. There were 22 structural
experiments and 8 functional experiments.
The overall effectiveness of the experiment selectors was not altered through the
use of structural information.
This is a very promising result, it implies that the experiment selectors are
quite robust. Given knowledge of the hypothesis space and the training example
space, the effectiveness of a experiment selection method could be predicted with
a fair amount of confidence.
Several results were consistent across this dissertation:
Performance. The number of available experiments was irrelevant to the perfor-
mance. Only the number of experimental outcomes and the number of initial
hypotheses had a significant effect on active experimentation. Although ex-
periment bias did cause an improvement in the performance; still, at no time
did a selector perform as well as oRA CLE.Thus, tutoring is more effective
than experimenting. Also the nature of experiments and hypotheses seems
irrelevant: there was no significant change in the relative performance of the
selectors when using structural or functional hypotheses or experiments.
Robustness. Any form of experiment bias caused a significant increase in the
robustness of a selector.GREEDYis always more robust, but the robustness of
bothGREEDYandRELEVANTwas much closer toORACLEthan toRANDOM.
Complexity. Using preference bias to derive an experiment bias seems much to
expensive for the very small increase in performance and robustness.REL-
EVANTwas almost as good at a small fraction of the cost. It analyzes only
the restricted hypothesis space bias to derive its experiment bias.
Overall,RELEVANTwas the most effective of the selectors considered.
Finally we addressed the question of possible application of this research:153
Question 4 How should the trade-off between experimentation and theory forma-
tion be managed?
Any practical empirical research system will need to trade-off between theo-
ry formation and experimentation. The learning component will need training
examples to be effective in generating and eliminating hypotheses, but collecting
too many training examples without incorporating the knowledge gained into the
learning component is a waste of time.
The research presented in this dissertation suggests one possible strategy:
Phase 1: Exploratory experimentation. When research first begins in a new
area, virtually all experiments are relevant, so our "random" experiment
selection strategy will work well for a time. RANDOM can be implemented
without explicitly generating any hypotheses at all, only knowledge of the
experiments that are available is needed. Hence, it is appropriate to call it an
"exploratory" experiment selection strategy. Results from this dissertation
suggested that experiments with the largest number of probable outcomes
are the best ones to perform.
Phase 2: Relevant experimentation. After enough data has been collected
and it is possible to generate hypotheses, the researcher could switch from
random to relevant experiments. These experiments are also known as "dis-
criminatory" or "crucial" experiments, because they discriminate between
(at least) two hypotheses.These can be designed by generating a small
number of hypotheses and constructing experiments to discriminate among
them. Our research provides support for the common belief that discrimina-
tory experiments are valuable, especially in new and growing fields.
This concludes the evaluation of our work. We now list and discuss the major
contributions of this work.154
7.2Contributions of this Dissertation
This dissertation has made several contributions to the study of experimental
methodology. These contributions included: (a) defining a frame-work for study-
ing experimentation, (b) demonstrating that active control and relevance are the
most important factors involved in the effectiveness of empirical research, and (c)
discovering the important factors affecting experimental performance.
We defined a frame-work for use in researching empirical methodology. Ex-
periment bias was defined as the criterion an experiment selector used to guide
experiment selection. We also defined a normative experiment selector which we
called EXHAUSTIVE. It describes how an experiment selector should perform. Sev-
eral approximations to this normative model were then presented and shown to be
good approximations. The effectiveness of an experiment bias was measured as a
combination of its performance, its robustness, and its computational cost.
We demonstrated that active control of experimental inputs is critical and that
the most effective experiment bias was to assure that experiments are relevant
that they would eliminate at least one of the hypotheses being considered. This
makes simple active training example selectors appear extremely attractivethere
is no need for complex analysis of the theory bias to achieve acceptable perfor-
mance (although no active training example selector appeared to approach the
performance of a tutored student).This lends weight to the faith put in dis-
crimination, crucial, and critical experiments [Platt:64]. Full look-ahead or greedy
probabilistic techniques were not worth the extreme computational effort for their
small gain in performance.
We discovered that the most important factors affecting performance of the
experimenter were the initial number of hypotheses considered and the number
of experimental outcomes. The number of experiments and any learning system
preference bias had little or no effect. This suggests that the researcher should
try to work in a hypothesis space that is as small as possible where experiments155
have a large but reasonable number of possible results. The raw number of possible
experiments is not a significant factor that needs to be considered when developing
the hypothesis and training example languages.
7.3Future Research Directions
There are still many open questions to the research presented in this disserta-
tion, which we group under three headings. First, we feel a detailed theoretical
analysis of experiment selection is necessary. We presented an initial theoretical
analysis of the results based on empirical fitting of the data gathered. Work in
domains other than combinational logic circuits and binary functions needs to be
performed to expand and verify the empirical results presented.
Second, there are several important questions about the derivation and use of
experiment bias that need investigation.
What is the space of useful experiment biases?
We defined and investigated three experiment biases derived from theory bias:
two using preference bias and one using restricted hypothesis space bias. These are
only three of the possible biases. Just as machine learning has classified the space
of theory biases, the space of experiment biases needs to be defined and explored.
How important is experiment bias early in the learning process?
We suggest in Question 4 that it is not important, but this needs to be inves-
tigated: both in our domain and in other domains.
Can performance be improved by changing the experiment bias "on the
fly"?
This would involve tracking the performance of the experiment selector dur-
ing use and determining that the current conditions would favor another type of156
experiment bias, then switching to an experiment selector that implemented that
new experiment bias.For question 4 above we suggest a simple version of this
type of strategy: switching from RANDOM to the RELEVANT. An open question is
determining when to make a switch like this.
Another facet of this question deals with "can an incorrect experiment bias be
detected and corrected on the fly?"
For example, GREEDY, using preference bias in Chapter Five, performed better
when using a forward ordering than when using a reverse ordering.It would be
worthwhile to determine if this could be detected and altered during the learning
trial, and if this operation is cost effective.
Last, we review the many simplifying assumptions we have made throughout
this dissertation: some were made for convenience, some because of the intractabil-
ity they would present to our research. All these were pointed out as they arose
in this dissertation:
Performance measures other than experiment sequence length
In Chapter Two we discussed several other performance metrics a learning
system could use, including: (a) experiment sequence length to discover the cor-
rect theory, (b) accuracy of the learned theory, and (c) identifiability of a class
of hypotheses. We investigated aspects of both (a) and (c).Our exact stop-
ping criterion guaranteed perfect performance and accuracy of the learned theory,
while the GERR stopping criterion guaranteed a given level of performance for the
learned theory (saying nothing about the accuracy of the learned theory itself).
Other stopping criteria should be investigated, although the implication from our
work suggests that there may be no real difference between stopping criteria when
measuring experiment length to stopping criteria.
One aspect of these factors we did not investigate was determining a learning
curve for performance or accuracy (where a learning curve plots the number of
experiments performed verses the performance metric). This yields information157
about how rapidly a learning system converges on the performance for a given
performance metric.This could be very useful information, for example:if a
learning system must perform while it is learning, then good performance after
few training examples would be necessary.
The identifiability of a class of hypotheses is also an important factor, but one
better dealt with theoretically rather than empirically.
Input and output noise
In any real empirical research work, measurement noise is always present. This
presents interesting problems for the experiment selector. For example, measure-
ment error must be taken into account when determining if an experiment is rel-
evant. If the measurement error is 1 unit, then an experiment that depends on
a difference of 1000 units is far preferable to an experiment depending on a dif-
ference of 0.001 units. Discovering, determining, and modeling the measurement
errors and taking these errors into account is a necessary extension to make this
work practical.
Experiments that have significant and/or different costs
In reality, most experiments have an associated cost for performing them. These
costs must be factored into the determination of which experiment to perform next.
For example, if the best experiment is determined to require the construction of
Hubble Space Telescope and a less-than-optimal experiment can use an existing
telescope, then the less-than-optimal experiment may be the one to perform be-
cause of the great cost involved in performing the optimal experiment.
Unknown inputs
Early in the understanding of an unknown system it is often true that un-
known inputs exist. These often manifests as systematic and unpredictable errors.158
In many cases it is possible to detect and correct for systematic errors. This would
be very useful addition to an autonomous learning system that has not been in-
vestigated.
Internal state
We have shown how internal state that was observable could be modeled as
a feedback loop (Chapter Three). The problem with unobservable internal state
is that it is unobservable. This is still an open question for the entire learning
community.
In vivo experimentation
In vitro experimentation was investigated by this work. This isolates the un-
known system from its environment to aid in controlling all inputs while the func-
tion of the system is studied. In vivo experimentation studies the unknown system
in its natural environment. This might be because it is impossible to isolate the
system and place it into a controlled environment (e.g., the Sun) or because the
researcher is studying how the system interacts with its "natural" environment
(e.g., sociology). The problem is that some, or all, of the system inputs will be
uncontrollable (if the researcher is trying to see the natural interactions, then this
is by choice), so the researcher is often (at least partially) a passive observer. Our
work suggests that the researcher should work at trying to focus the observations
and look for occurrences that eliminate hypotheses (a sort of relevant observation).
A researcher who has several competing theories would study those theories to de-
termine what likely observable events could be relevant, then focus attention where
these events should occur. This seems an open area where some of our work can
be used as an initial guideline.159
Global interactions
Modeling of an unknown system is often done using a reductionist strategy.
The idea being to decompose the unknown system, reducing it to basic and easy
to understand subsystems. Once these are understood the system may then be
modeled as a composition of these simple subsystems. Unfortunately, in many cases
these are interactions between the subsystems which do not manifest themselves
when the subsystems are studied in isolation. In Chapter Six we investigated a
system that has local interactions (e.g., the interconnection of gates), but we could
not model global interactions (e.g., the environment the logic circuit is embedded
in). Hence, this could often be modeled as a global state variable. Unfortunately,
if the global state is not observable, modeling it is an open question.
Structural preference bias
Due to computational costs we did not investigate the effect that preference
bias, and experiment bias derived from it, could have on the performance of the
selectors for structural experiments. The results in this dissertation suggest that
it will have very little effect, but until this is verified this is just a supposition.
In conclusion, this dissertation presents an initial investigation into the effec-
tiveness of experimentation in the learning process. Although we did determine
that experimentation is effective, much work needs to be done before a deep un-
derstanding of the experimental process and its limitations is achieved.160
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